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Article

Waiving Innocence
Samuel R. Wiseman

†

INTRODUCTION
When a procedural development opens a new door for criminal defendants, it has a tendency to rapidly shut. Following
the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona,
for example, courts have whittled away at the rights announced
1
therein until they have become little more than formalities.
The same pattern emerged after Gideon v. Wainwright, as subsequent decisions stretched the definition of counsel to include
2
vastly overworked and/or underperforming attorneys. Similarly, although the right to postconviction DNA testing has only recently become well established, backsliding has already begun.
DNA testing has enabled more than 270 wrongfully con3
victed individuals to prove their innocence and has cleared
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1. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona, 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 16–25 (2010) (describing the dismantling of Miranda and how cases have “invite[d] police officers to
simply ignore it”); Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin’s New Governance Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 645, 667 (describing Miranda’s lack of protection in practice); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (declaring a right to
counsel); see David L. Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64
GEO. L.J. 811, 818 (1976).
3. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ ( last visited
Nov. 30, 2011) (showing 280 individuals exonerated as of November 19, 2011,
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countless innocent suspects at the investigative stage. DNA evidence will, of course, not solve all of the flaws of current investigative, conviction, and sentencing procedures, but, in the tento-twenty percent of criminal cases where DNA evidence is
5
available, it is essential. If properly handled, tested, and characterized in court, DNA evidence can offer the most definitive
proof of a defendant’s innocence or guilt, thus providing cer6
tainty for all parties involved—including the victim. Unlike
eyewitness testimony, DNA evidence does not rely upon fuzzy
human memory, which can be dangerously influenced by many
7
factors unrelated to the identity of the perpetrator. Nor does it
rely upon the broad, often inconsistent standards governing the
8
9
matching of a fingerprint or a piece of hair to a defendant.
and explaining that the project works to exonerate “wrongfully convicted individuals through DNA testing”).
4. See, e.g., Katherine L. Prevost O’Connor, Eliminating the Rape-Kit
Backlog: Bringing Necessary Changes to the Criminal Justice System, 72
UMKC L. REV. 193, 198 (2003) (discussing how testing can “quickly eliminate
suspects who do not have the identified DNA blueprint”).
5. See Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent
Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ.
L. REV. 655, 656 (2005) (explaining that approximately eighty to ninety percent of cases lack biological evidence).
6. Cf. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY.,
NAT. RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 114 (2009) (“Methods that
are specified in more detail (such as DNA analysis, where particular genetic
loci are to be compared) will have greater credibility and also are more amenable to systematic improvement than those that rely more heavily on the
judgments of the investigator.”) But see Meghan J. Ryan, Remedying Wrongful
Execution, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 12–13)
(noting the limitations of DNA evidence, such as its unavailability in many
cases and its degradation over time), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1902811.
7. BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION:
THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 55–113 (1995) (describing psychological and other factors that influence the accuracy of eyewitness testimony); C.D. Lefebvre et al., Use of Event-Related Brain Potentials (ERPs) to Assess Eyewitness Accuracy and Deception, 73 INT’L. J. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 218,
218 (2009) (referencing the “sizable body of research that has criticized and
demonstrated the unreliability of eyewitness identifications”).
8. Cf. Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 75–
76 (2006) (describing how out of “five fingerprint experts” with, together, “over
85 years of experience in examining fingerprints,” eighty percent identified a
different fingerprint match than they had identified of the same fingerprint
five years earlier, highlighting the unreliability of fingerprinting).
9. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2092 (2000) (criticizing “inherently suspect hair comparisons”). Not all DNA evidence will establish guilt or innocence, of course. See
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And perhaps even more importantly, DNA evidence can, in
some cases, help illustrate flaws in the investigative and adjudicative processes and thereby reduce the rate of wrongful conviction in the many cases in which biological evidence is
10
unavailable.
As a result, DNA has provoked a small revolution in crimi11
nal procedure, causing almost every state legislature, as well
12
as Congress, to rethink well-established notions of finality in
order to allow for post-conviction testing and relief. Moreover,
two-thirds of these jurisdictions, recognizing the thoroughly
documented pressures that lead some innocent defendants to
13
plead guilty or nolo contendere, have extended the right to
Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919, 2949
(2010) (“Most states adopt requirements that the DNA testing be potentially
probative of innocence. Such a standard certainly makes sense. For example,
DNA testing would serve no useful purpose in a case where the convict still
concedes that he had sexual intercourse with the victim, but maintains that
there was consent.”).
10. See Kruse, supra note 1, at 721 (describing DNA exoneration as “the
‘gold standard’ of proof that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, allowing the
opportunity to examine what went wrong in specific cases of wrongful convictions and the implications that diagnosis might have for larger systemic reform”); Samuel Wiseman, Innocence After Death, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 687,
720 (2010) (arguing that more detailed findings are important in DNA exoneration cases in order to reveal the causes of wrongful convictions and provide
lessons for courts); INNOCENCE COMMISSION FOR VA., http://www.icva.us/
exonerate.org/icva/index.html ( last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (explaining that the
Virginia Innocence Commission was formed “[t]o assist in examining the problems that may lead to wrongful convictions”); Mission Statement, STATE OF
CONN. JUD. BRANCH, ADVISORY COMMISSION ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS,
http://www.jud.ct.gov/committees/wrongfulconviction/ ( last visited Nov. 30,
2011) (explaining that the commission, based on its examinations of wrongful
convictions, “will suggest best practices for law enforcement, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges that will decrease the possibility of convicting an
innocent person”). See generally CALIFORNIA COMM. ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (2008), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/
CCFAJFinalReport.pdf (recommending reforms based on its investigation of
wrongful convictions).
11. See, e.g., Dist. Atty’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2323 (2009)
(“DNA evidence will undoubtedly lead to changes in the criminal justice system. It has done so already.”).
12. See infra notes 14–22.
13. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False
Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 430 (1998)
(citing literature that documents “numerous case examples” of false confessions); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J.
1979, 1981 (1992) (observing that innocent defendants tend to be risk averse
and therefore more likely to plead guilty); False Confessions, THE INNOCENCE
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php
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testing to those who did not insist on trial. This revolution—
while by no means complete—has extended to the rules govern( last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (“In about 25% of DNA exoneration cases, innocent
defendants made incriminating statements, delivered outright confessions or
pled guilty.”). Of the first 225 DNA exonerations, the Innocence Project has
identified fifty-one underlying convictions that resulted from a “[f ]alse confession/admission.” Causes of Wrongful Conviction, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ ( last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
Twenty-three of these cases involved guilty pleas. When the Innocent Plead
Guilty, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/
When_the_Innocent_Plead_Guilty.php# ( last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
14. In 2008, Brandon Garrett identified forty-five states in total ( plus the
District of Columbia) that either grant statutory access to postconviction DNA
testing or have a state supreme court-recognized right to postconviction DNA
testing of “newly discovered evidence of innocence.” Brandon Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1673–74 (2008). With the addition of
statutes in Alabama, Alaska, and South Carolina, this number has now risen
to forty-eight. See infra note 21. Of these forty-eight, approximately thirty allow defendants who pleaded guilty to request postconviction DNA testing. See
Garrtt, supra, at 1680–81, 1680 n.238 (explaining that sixteen states require
that “the defendant have disputed identity and have claimed innocence
at . . . trial” and that additionally, New York disallows DNA testing from some
guilty plea cases, and Utah impliedly requires that a defendant have previously advanced a theory of innocence at trial). Approximately fifteen statutes currently deny DNA testing to defendants who pleaded guilty. See ALA. CODE
§ 15-18-200 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (allowing testing only in capital cases and
only where “forensic DNA testing was not performed on the case at the time of
the initial trial”); ALASKA STAT. § 12.73.010 (2010) (allowing DNA testing only
where “applicant did not admit or concede guilt under oath” but allowing a
court to “waive this requirement in the interest of justice”); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-112-202(6)(A) (2006) (allowing a motion for DNA testing where “[t]he person making a motion under this section identifies a theory of defense
that . . . [i]s not inconsistent with an affirmative defense presented at the trial
of the offense being challenged”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 (2007) (allowing a motion where “[t]he movant presents a prima facie case that identity was
an issue in the trial”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 116-3( b)(1) (West 2008)
(allowing a defendant’s motion where “identity was the issue in the trial which
resulted in his [or her] conviction”); 15 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 2138(4)(D) (2003) (requiring a court to order DNA analysis if “[t]he identity
of the person as the perpetrator of the crime that resulted in the conviction
was at issue during the person’s trial”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 770.16(4)( b)(iii) (West Supp. 2011) (requiring a court to order DNA testing
where the defendant establishes that “[t]he identity of the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime was at issue during his trial”); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 590.01 (West 2010) (requiring defendant to make a prima facie case that
“identity was an issue in the trial”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 547.035(2)(4) (West
2002) (requiring the motion to include an oath that “[i]dentity was an issue in
the trial”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a) ( McKinney 2005) (requiring
the court to grant the motion for DNA testing of evidence if “a DNA test had
been conducted on such evidence, and if the results had been admitted in the
trial resulting in the judgment, there exists a reasonable probability that the
verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant”); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 29-32.1-15 (2006) (requiring person making the motion to present a prima
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15

ing the legal profession, and has provoked a welcome discussion on the role of the prosecutor in preventing wrongful con16
victions. Indeed, the right to DNA testing already represents
the greatest advance in criminal justice since Gideon and Mi17
randa, but, just as occurred with these other transformative
rights, the force of the right is at risk of diminishing. The reasons for the erosion of Miranda and Gideon are complex and
facie case that “[i]dentity was an issue in the trial”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2953.74(C)(2)(c)(3) (LexisNexis 2010) (allowing a court to accept an application for testing only if “[t]he court determines that, at the trial stage in the
case . . . the identity of the person who committed the offense was an issue”);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9543.1 (West 2007) (requiring a motion to show
that “identity of . . . the perpetrator was at issue in the proceedings”); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a) (West 2006) (allowing a court to order
testing only where “identity was or is an issue in the case”); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78B-9-301(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring an allegation that “states a theory of defense, not inconsistent with theories previously asserted at trial”).
Out of the sixteen states originally identified by Garrett as requiring identity
to be an issue at trial, four of the states additionally appear to allow defendants who pleaded guilty to request DNA testing. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 194902(c)(1), (d) (2004) (allowing a defendant’s petition where “[i]dentity was an
issue in the trial which resulted in his conviction” but also allowing “[a] petitioner who pleaded guilty in the underlying case” to file a DNA-testing petition); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10(2)( b), (d) (West 2009) (requiring a defendant, in
making a motion to state “[t]he facts of the underlying case, as proven at trial
or admitted to during a guilty plea proceeding” and “[w]hether identity was at
issue or contested by the defendant” (emphasis added)); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 311A-2(C)(5) (West 2003) (requiring petitioner to show that “identity was an issue in his case or that if the DNA testing he is requesting had been performed
prior to his conviction and the results had been exculpatory, there is a reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have pled guilty or been found
guilty” (emphasis added)); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 138.692, 138.694
(West2003) (only requiring identity to be at issue for counsel appointment).
15. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g), (h) (2011) (requiring
prosecutors to investigate and seek to remedy wrongful convictions when sufficient evidence becomes available). As of January 2011, five states had adopted the new rules in some form, and eleven jurisdictions were studying them.
AM. BAR ASS’N CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., VARIATIONS OF THE
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF E S S I O N A L CONDUCT RULE 3.8(G) AND (H) (2011),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/3_8_
g_h.authcheckdam.pdf.
16. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2119, 2132 (2010) (discussing prosecutors’ role in preventing wrongful
convictions); Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35,
37 (2009) (observing that a “key variable . . . in the ability of a criminal defendant to have a chance for success on a post-conviction claim of innocence
often lies in the nature of the prosecutor’s response”).
17. See David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of PostConviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1028–29 (2010) (observing that exonerations, “made possible largely because of new DNA technology, constitute
the most dramatic story in American criminal law over the past two decades”).
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well-documented, but in short, almost as soon as the rights
were announced, police, prosecutors, legislatures, and courts
began to hollow them out. Police sometimes engage in outright
18
trickery, wearing down defendants with questioning and lies.
Legislatures, on the other hand, provide minimal funding for
public defense, forcing defenders to take on unrealistic case
19
burdens. There is a danger that, as the novelty of DNA testing
wears off—both for actors within the justice system and the
general public—the right to DNA testing will follow the same
path as the rights announced in Miranda and Gideon. This Article focuses on one way in which this has already begun.
20
21
In the past sixteen years forty-eight states, the District
22
23
of Columbia, and the federal government have created statu24
tory rights to DNA preservation, access, and testing. These
statutory rights are particularly important in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in District Attorney’s Office v.
Osborne, which rejected a substantive due process right to DNA
25
testing. Some prosecutors, however, have found a way around
them. Through plea bargaining, these prosecutors have ob18. Cf. Kruse, supra note 1 (addressing the Miranda right’s erosion and
how “interrogators have worked their techniques around its requirements”).
19. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, AMERICA’S CONTINUING
QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE iv (2004), available at
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defen
dants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam
.pdf (describing testimony from thirty-two expert witnesses on indigent defense and concluding that “thousands of persons are processed through America’s courts each year either with no lawyer at all or with a lawyer who does
not have the time, resources, or in some cases the inclination to provide effective representation” and that “[t]he fundamental right to a lawyer that Americans assume appl[ies] to everyone accused of criminal conduct effectively does
not exist in practice for countless people across the United States”).
20. New York enacted the first post conviction DNA-testing statute in
1994. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 1722.
21. See id. (describing how forty-five states provided a right to
postconviction DNA testing in 2008). The Innocence Project in 2011 identified
a total of forty-eight; Alabama, Alaska, and Mississippi have passed testing
statutes since the publication of Garrett’s article. Access to Post-Conviction
DNA Testing, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/Access_To_PostConviction_DNA_Testing.php# ( last visited Nov. 30,
2011); see ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.73.010 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-28-30 (2010).
22. D.C. CODE §§ 22-4131 to 33 (LexisNexis 2010).
23. Innocence Protection Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) (2006).
24. The scope of these rights varies substantially. See generally Garrett,
supra note 14, at 1675–82 (discussing differences among the various state
statutes).
25. 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2323 (2009).
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tained waivers of the right to DNA testing and/or the preserva26
tion of DNA evidence. This Article collectively refers to these
waivers as DNA waivers.
The number of DNA waivers obtained by state and federal
prosecutors is unclear, but at the federal level, they have been
sought by a number of United States Attorneys’ offices during
the administrations of the second President Bush and Presi27
dent Obama. The federal statute that grants certain defendants access to DNA evidence expressly recognizes the possibility of defendants’ waiving this statutory right by providing that
28
the waiver must be knowing and voluntary. A 2004 Department of Justice memorandum directed federal prosecutors to
elicit waivers of these statutory DNA-testing rights from de29
fendants, and, until 2010, some federal districts used a stand30
ardized plea agreement that contained DNA waiver language.
In late 2010, recognizing the inconsistency and other potential
pitfalls of the practice, Attorney General Eric Holder discouraged prosecutors from including DNA waivers in plea bargains
unless exceptional circumstances suggest that waiver is merit31
ed. Policy could change with future administrations, and the
memorandum is not binding on state prosecutors. While there
is reason to think that the idea has occurred to state prosecu32
tors, the evidence suggests they are not yet widely obtaining
33
these waivers. It is impossible to say with any certainty
whether that will change, but any practice that limits challenges to prosecutors’ hard-earned convictions while simultaneously
34
trimming expenditures is likely to have strong appeal.
Building from the literature on waivers of rights in other
plea bargain contexts, this Article argues that courts are likely
to deem DNA waivers generally enforceable, and that while
there are valid concerns underlying their use, they are, on the
26. See infra text accompanying notes 55–63.
27. The Obama Administration has moved away from the use of DNA
waivers. See infra text accompanying note 31.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a).
29. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to all Fed.
Prosecutors 1 (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/ag-memo
-dna-waivers111810.pdf (describing the 2004 memorandum).
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 66–70.
33. Justice Department Stops Policy on DNA Waivers, NPR (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/2010/11/18/131423969/justice-to-stop-forcing-dna-waivers.
34. See infra text accompanying note 316.
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whole, deeply problematic. Further, waivers have a serious potential for misuse, as they could conceal failures to disclose exculpatory material, and other misconduct. Waivers also create
perverse incentives for the vast majority of generally ethical
prosecutors. With an assurance that a case will not be challenged with the most definitive available evidence, prosecutors
may be less scrupulous in their investigation of a case and more
35
eager to quickly dispose of it through a plea bargain. Finally,
if DNA waivers are a routine component of plea bargaining, the
commitment to innocence motivating the approximately thirty
state statutes that currently grant access to DNA testing to de36
fendants who have pleaded guilty —individuals who account
37
for the great majority of recent convictions —will be substantially undermined.
Set against these clear risks, there are, arguably, significant gains to be achieved through the use of DNA waivers.
DNA waivers may well lead to more meaningful guilty pleas
and reduce the number of unmeritorious testing claims, which
financially burden the system and psychologically burden vic38
tims and their families. Less obviously, prosecutorial demands
for DNA waivers could lead some innocent defendants to insist
on trial, and, perhaps, slightly increase the information available to prosecutors at the plea bargaining stage; innocent defendants who would otherwise sign a guilty plea might balk at
39
the waiver, thus signaling innocence, while guilty defendants
may signal their guilt by more readily signing away their testing and preservation rights. Ultimately, however, the Article
concludes that the costs of using DNA waivers likely outweigh
their benefits.
35. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 183, 312 (describing a prosecutor’s preference for an appeal waiver and one court’s denial of an appeal
waiver based on the fear that waivers insulate prosecutorial errors from
review).
36. See sources cited supra note 14.
37. Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism
Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 658 (2010)
(“Today, guilty pleas resolve 95 percent of adjudicated cases, and most of these
result from plea bargains.”).
38. See Tonja Jacobi & Gwendolyn Carroll, Acknowledging Guilt: Forcing
Self-Identification in Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 263,
268–69 (2008).
39. Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values
and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1384 (2003) (discussing the reasons innocent defendants plead guilty).
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This Article will evaluate the scope of DNA waivers,
whether and under what circumstances the waivers will be upheld, and the justifications behind their use. Part I identifies
the practice of prosecutors’ use of DNA waivers in plea bargaining. Part II addresses whether these waivers are enforceable,
with a particular focus on the Supreme Court’s recent criminal
waiver jurisprudence, and Part III argues that despite the likely validity of DNA waivers in many jurisdictions (although
there may be some disagreement about how “knowing” a waiver
must be), they are nonetheless problematic.
I. DNA TESTING WAIVERS: PRESENT AND FUTURE
DNA waivers are likely of minor import if they are used infrequently, although even one waiver signed by an innocent defendant would be deeply troubling. The qualitative empirical
evidence suggests, however, that waivers have been pursued by
prosecutors in a number of populous federal districts, and although no court has directly addressed their validity, appeals of
these past waivers are likely. This Part introduces the problems underlying DNA waivers, identifies the past use of DNA
waivers, and predicts future trends, suggesting that use at the
state level could potentially expand.
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WAIVER PROBLEM
40

Despite stubborn perceptions to the contrary, innocent de41
fendants plead guilty. Eight percent of the wrongfully convicted defendants exonerated by DNA initially entered guilty

40. See John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88, 95–
96 (1977) (describing a “presumption . . . that innocent defendants will in fact
contest charges lodged against them” but describing why “[i]nnocent defendants may nonetheless offer pleas rather than contest their guilt at trial”); Erica Hashimoto, Toward Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 949, 950
(2008) (describing “faulty assumptions that . . . factually innocent defendants
will not plead guilty”).
41. Barkai, supra note 40, at 97; Josh Bowers, The Unusual Man in the
Usual Place, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 260, 261 (2009), available at
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/05-2009/Bowers.pdf; Russell D. Covey,
Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 1237, 1239 (2008); cf. Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 651, 656 (2007) (observing “that an unknown but likely troubling number of defendants pleading
guilty probably” lack the knowledge of whether they are guilty or not);
Schulhofer, supra note 13, at 1982 (noting that “some innocents will accept the
relatively high offer, despite substantial probabilities for acquittal at trial”).
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42

pleas, and the strong incentives that push some innocent defendants to plead guilty remain, suggesting that this trend may
43
continue. As discussed more thoroughly in Part III, many innocent defendants—in part due to their innocence—often lack
44
crucial information about a case and may have trouble responding to prosecutorial claims of available implicating evidence.
Even in the absence of guilty pleas by innocents, pleas that
deny access to DNA evidence and allow for its destruction have
troublesome societal effects. They reflect a criminal justice sys45
tem grounded in convenience, not truth. DNA waivers also
cover up prosecutorial misconduct and reduce incentives for
46
prosecutors to thoroughly examine the accuracy of convictions,
47
prevent the identification of the real perpetrators of crimes,
weaken the powerful legislative commitment to factual inno48
cence, and incentivize guilty defendants to loudly proclaim in49
nocence —thus diluting true innocence claims. The systemic
effects alone justify a searching investigation of the practice.

42. See infra text accompanying note 293; cf. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 536 (2005) (in a study that predated the Innocence Project figures, finding that less than six percent of wrongful convictions for rape and
murder arose from guilty pleas, whereas guilty pleas led to a higher percentage of wrongful drug convictions).
43. See, e.g., Barkai, supra note 40, at 96–97 ( providing eight factors that
may push an innocent defendant to plead guilty, including, among others, the
“potentially overwhelming nature of the evidence against him,” “feelings of
hopelessness, powerlessness, or despair when faced with the power of the
state,” and “ignorance”); cf. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1117, 1119–20, 1132 (2008) (arguing in favor of plea bargains for innocent defendants and noting the frequency of guilty pleas by these defendants:
the “best resolution” for the “typical” innocent defendant—a “recidivist facing
petty charges”—“is generally a quick plea in exchange for a light, bargainedfor sentence;” the “costs of proceeding to trial often dwarf plea prices”).
44. See Hashimoto, supra note 40, at 951 (describing how “[i]nnocent defendants . . . cannot accurately evaluate the strength of the case against
them”); Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 971 (1989) (describing informational problems
faced by defendants generally, including “defects in perception or awareness,”
“defects in memory, in which the defendant cannot remember information critical to liability,” and “defects in a defendant’s expertise in resolving factual issues critical to liability”).
45. See infra notes 306–07 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 316–20 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 328–31 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 321–26 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 331–32 and accompanying text.
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B. RECENT USE OF DNA WAIVERS
Although there has been little scholarship on DNA waiv50
ers, numerous United States Attorneys’ offices have used
51
them for roughly the last five years. Like many states, the
federal government allows certain defendants to request DNA
testing and to use the results of this testing to bring postconviction innocence claims. The Innocence Protection Act of
2004 provides:
Upon a written motion by an individual under a sentence of imprisonment or death pursuant to a conviction for a Federal offense (referred to in this section as the “applicant”), the court that entered the
judgment of conviction shall order DNA testing of specific evidence
52
[after having made prerequisite findings].

Prior to the Act’s passage, language allowing the right to
be waived was added, apparently at the request of Republican
53
senators: before granting DNA testing in a federal case, a
court must find that the defendant did not “knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to request DNA testing of that evidence in a court proceeding after the date of enactment of the
54
Innocence Protection Act of 2004.” After the Act passed despite the Bush Administration’s opposition, the Justice De-

50. Several scholars have pointed to the existence of induced DNA waivers in passing, and all have relied upon newspaper articles to support this
claim; none have specified whether they believe the practice occurs at the federal or state level. Seth F. Kreimer and David Rudovsky directly observe that
“[ p]rosecutors have attempted to induce defendants to waive their rights to
the maintenance of DNA evidence . . . .” Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky,
Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 563 (2002). Cynthia E. Jones, in turn, notes that
“in an effort to preclude post-conviction DNA testing requests, a prosecutor’s
office recently began trying to require defendants to waive the preservation of
biological evidence as a prerequisite of getting a favorable plea offer.” Cynthia
E. Jones, Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost: The Preservation of Biological
Evidence Under Innocence Protection Statutes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239,
1269 (2005). Aviva Orenstein also refers to the practice in passing. See Aviva
Orenstein, Facing the Unfaceable: Dealing with Prosecutorial Denial in
Postconviction Cases of Actual Innocence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401, 409 n.42
(2011) (“Professor Brandon Garrett rightfully observed that the policy of requiring waivers of future DNA testing as part of plea bargains in federal court
sends ‘a terrible message: that federal prosecutors take a dim view of truth
telling.’” (citing Jerry Markon, Justice Dept. to Review Bush Policy on DNA
Test Waivers, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2009, at A1)).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 55–63.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) (2006).
53. Jerry Markon, Justice Dept. to Review Bush Policy on DNA Test, WASH.
POST, Oct. 11, 2009, at A1.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(3)(A)(i).
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partment “sent a secret memo to the nation’s 94 U.S.
55
[A]ttorney’s offices urging them to use the waivers.”
Although it is unclear exactly how many federal plea
agreements include DNA waivers, Department of Justice documents suggest that prosecutors in several jurisdictions have
sought numerous waivers since 2004. A 2010 Department of
Justice memorandum notes that, as a result of the 2004 memorandum, “[s]ome districts use a standard plea agreement that
contains an [Innocence Protection Act] waiver provision” (a
56
provision foregoing future rights to DNA testing). These waivers both preclude testing of the evidence and allow for its destruction. A standard plea agreement from the District of Columbia, for example, reads:
By entering this plea of guilty, your client waives any and all right
your client may have, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3600 [the federal Innocence Protection Act], to require DNA testing of any physical evidence
in the possession of the Government. Your client fully understands
that, as a result of this waiver, any physical evidence in this case will
not be preserved by the Government and will therefore not be availa57
ble for DNA testing in the future.

Nine other plea agreements from the District of Columbia,
culled from a small sample, include the same waiver lan58
59
guage, as does a plea offer from the District of Maryland.
DNA waivers from the Southern and Northern Districts of Illinois contain nearly identical language, which surrenders all fu60
ture rights to DNA testing and preservation. Other federal
55. Markon, supra note 53, at A7.
56. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., supra note 29, at 2.
57. Letter from Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William M. Sullivan, Jr. § 13 (Apr. 19, 2010) (on file with author).
58. Plea Agreement at 5, United States v. Jones, No. 1:06-cr-200-CKK
(D.D.C. July 14, 2008); Plea Agreement § 16, United States v. White, No. 1:08cr-00044 -RCL (D.D.C. May 1, 2008); Plea Agreement at 5, United States v.
Bruening, No. 1:07-cr-314 -RBW (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2008); Plea Agreement § 22,
United States v. Miller, No. 1:06-cr-289-RMC (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2007); Plea
Agreement § 20, United States v. Hamilton, No. 1:06-cr-200-CKK(1) (D.D.C.
Jan. 30, 2007); Plea Agreement § 19, United States v. Montalvo, No. 1:06-cr201-GK (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2006); Plea Agreement at 7, United States v. Waziry,
No. 1:06-cr-342-ESH (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2006); Plea Agreement § 20, United
States v. Wills, No. 1:06-cr-200-CKK(2) (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2006); Letter from
Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Mark H. Tuohey and William E.
Lawler, III § 14 ( Feb. 5, 2009) (on file with author) (regarding United States v.
Tejada, No. 09-MJ-77 (D.D.C.)).
59. Letter from Stuart M. Goldberg & Michael J. Leotta, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Joshua G. Berman, Esq. § 11 (Apr. 4, 2008) (on file with author).
60. Plea Agreement §§ 11, 12, United States v. McPike, No. 3:05-cr-30069WDS (S.D. Ill. May 6, 2005) ( providing that the defendant “consents to the de-
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waivers do not directly grant the right to evidence destruction
but suggest that destruction will occur. A waiver from the District of Connecticut, for example, provides in part:
The defendant understands his right to have all the physical evidence
in this case tested for DNA, has discussed this right with his counsel,
and knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to have such DNA
testing performed on the physical evidence in this case. Defendant
understands that, because he is waiving this right, the physical evidence in this case will likely be destroyed or will otherwise be una61
vailable for DNA testing in the future.

DNA waivers from the Eastern District of Virginia similarly contain provisions that specifically bar access to future DNA
evidence, but their language does not imply destruction:
The defendant also understands that Title 18, United States Code,
Section 3600 affords a defendant the right to request DNA testing of
evidence after conviction. Nonetheless, the defendant knowingly
waives that right. The defendant further understands that this waiver applies to DNA testing of any items of evidence in this case that
could be subjected to DNA testing, and that the waiver forecloses any
opportunity to have evidence submitted for DNA testing in this case
or in any post-conviction proceeding for any purpose, including to
support a claim of innocence to the charges admitted in this plea
62
agreement.

Other federal plea bargains contain a range of similar language—some more detailed in its description of its waiver, and
63
some more specific as to the destruction of the evidence.

struction of all items of physical evidence seized in this case” and that “he will
never have another opportunity to have the evidence in this case submitted for
DNA testing,” among other details); Plea Agreement § 21, United States v.
Headley, No. 09 CR 830-3 (N.D. Ill. undated) (on file with author).
61. Letter from Nora R. Dannehy & Ann M. Nevins, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to Arnold Kriss ( Feb. 11, 2010) (on file with author) (regarding plea agreement
in United States v. Natera, No. 3:09CR221(JCH)(HBF ) (D. Conn. 2010)).
62. E.g., Plea Agreement § 6, United States v. Almanza, No. l:09cr430
(E.D. Va. Dec. 17, 2009); Plea Agreement § 6, United States v. Jin, No. 09-CR249 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2009); Plea Agreement § 6, United States v. Eaves, No.
1:07cr140 (E.D. Va. May 14, 2007); Plea Agreement § 6, United States v.
Gomez, No. l:07cr125 (E.D. Va. Apr. 20, 2007) (on file with author).
63. See, e.g., Plea Agreement § 12, United States v. Li, No. 2:09-cr-00067SJO (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2009) (specifically listing the available evidence and
surrendering the right to testing of DNA evidence); Plea Agreement § VII.D,
United States v. Ortega, No. 2:09-CR-00517 GEB (E.D. Cal. undated) (on file
with author) ( listing the specific items of evidence available in the case, stating that the “defendant knowingly and voluntarily gives up [the] right [to
DNA testing] with respect to both the specific items listed above and any other
items of evidence there may be in this case that might be amenable to DNA
testing,” and stating that the defendant will “never have another opportunity
to have the evidence in this case submitted for DNA testing”).
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In the short term, DNA waivers will likely diminish quickly at the federal level due to a recently announced policy discouraging the practice. In November 2010, Attorney General
Holder announced to all federal prosecutors that, in a revision
to the 2004 policy, “the Department should not, as a matter of
general policy, seek to foreclose the possibility of postconviction
DNA testing under the Innocence Protection Act (IPA), 18
64
U.S.C. § 3600, as part of plea agreements with defendants.”
Instead, “waivers of DNA testing pursuant to the Innocence
Protection Act (IPA) [must] be sought or accepted by federal
65
prosecutors only under exceptional circumstances.”
At the state level, the use of DNA waivers is not as clear.
Although a representative of the National District Attorneys
66
Association has decried the practice, evidence of state practic67
es remains difficult to obtain, and an informal survey pro68
duced few responses at the state level. There is some evidence
that the district attorney in Williamson County, Texas—home
69
to approximately 400,000 people —has advised his peers to insert permission to destroy DNA evidence into plea bargains be70
cause “innocence trumps everything.” At present, however,
the available evidence suggests that DNA waivers are not
commonly used at the state level.
C. POTENTIAL FUTURE TRENDS
Although prosecutors’ use of DNA waivers will at least
temporarily decline at the federal level, there is, of course, no
guarantee that future Attorneys General will not reinstate a
pro-waiver policy. Moreover, as prosecutors’ offices around the
country deal with budget constraints, there will be a tempta64. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., supra note 29.
65. Id.
66. Markon, supra note 53, at A7 (“Joshua Marquis, who sits on the executive committee of the National District Attorneys Association, said he’s never
heard of DNA waivers in state court and that the organization opposes the
concept. ‘I think it’s important to always leave the door open for actual proof of
innocence,’ he said.”).
67. Cf. Anup Malani, Habeas Settlements, 92 VA. L. REV. 1, 26 (2006) (relying upon survey for data on habeas waivers).
68. Survey of Select Defense Attorneys and State Prosecutors (Oct. 2010
to Feb. 2011) (on file with author).
69. Williamson County, Texas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts
.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48491.html ( last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
70. DAs Dislike Criticisms of DNA Destruction Practices, GRITS FOR
BREAKFAST ( Feb. 27, 2007), http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2007/02/das
-dislike-criticisms-of-dna.html.
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tion to use DNA waivers to cut costs. A useful historical analogy is found in the expansion of appeal and habeas waivers in
plea agreements. As Nancy King and Michael O’Neill explain,
71
the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and its new
sentencing guidelines created a climate of appeal, wherein
“[a]ppellate review of sentencing emerged as the primary enforcement mechanism for sentencing reform in federal courts as
72
well as in the courts of more than a dozen states.” Following
the Reform Act, prosecutors and criminal defendants argued on
appeal that sentences were too low or high, and judges inter73
preted and defined the scope of the guidelines. With the rise of
the appeal, however, quickly came practices that began to undermine its usefulness. In 1995, prosecutors began entering
agreements with defendants “to drop or not to add a charge, so
long as the defendant agreed in return to waive everything in74
cluding the right to appeal.” These waivers served to preserve
prosecutorial resources. As one prosecutor told King and
O’Neill: “We were spending attorney resources on appeals [in
cases that] we eventually won. We have in the office only generalists; our trial attorneys do their own appellate briefs. A couple
75
big appeals per year can hurt your indictment productivity.”
The use of the waivers quickly spread among the circuits,
and within the same year, six circuits (in addition to the three
that had already validated appeal waivers) affirmed the validi76
ty of the practice. Prosecutors’ affinity for waivers was contagious. A Washington memorandum soon directed prosecutors to
“consider whether the employment of appeal waivers would be
77
a ‘useful addition’ in their districts,” and by 1999, Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure had been amended to
specifically recognize appeal waivers; it required judges accepting plea agreements to warn defendants in court that they were
78
giving up their right to appeal. Following the amendment and
further favorable court decisions, “defense attorneys in districts
71. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
72. Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of
Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 215 (2005).
73. Id. at 214 –15.
74. Id. at 220.
75. Id. at 221.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Cf. United States v. Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d 11, 13–14 (1st Cir.
2008) (applying Rule 11 to an appeal waiver).
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where appeal waivers were still uncommon found waivers pro79
posed as part of every plea agreement.” Waivers of habeas
rights experienced a similar trajectory. A survey conducted in
2006 revealed that twenty-seven out of thirty-five federal districts and ten out of nineteen states surveyed used habeas
80
waivers.
As indicated by the pervasiveness of DNA waivers in certain United States Attorneys’ offices in recent years, the history
of the expansion of the use of appeal and habeas waivers, and
the likelihood that prosecutors’ offices around the country will
be faced with difficult budget choices in the coming years, it is
likely that at least some prosecutors will continue to seek DNA
waivers. It is therefore important to understand the legal and
81
practical implications of their use. The following Part explores
the validity of DNA waivers obtained in a variety of factual
scenarios, analogizing from court decisions and legal literature
addressing appeal and habeas waivers.
II. VALIDITY AND SCOPE OF DNA WAIVERS
As established in Part I, DNA waivers were at one point
relatively common at the federal level and could become common again as leadership changes; little would prevent Attorney
General Holder or a future Attorney General from reversing
the federal policy against DNA waivers tomorrow, or two years
from now. Further, the history of appellate waivers in plea bargains and their rapid expansion from the federal to the state
level suggests that DNA waivers may follow the same path. On82
ly three states have banned the practice, and when prosecutors have an opportunity to make their conviction more bulletproof while simultaneously preserving their budgets, there is a
good chance that some of them will seize it. Given the importance and potential prevalence of DNA waivers, this Part
explores their validity. The discussion begins by addressing the
79. King & O’Neill, supra note 72, at 224.
80. Malani, supra note 67, at 8.
81. Even with the temporary pause in waivers at the federal level, for example, courts will likely soon see legal challenges to the validity of existing
waivers.
82. See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. At least one state court
has held that a waiver of the right “to withdraw a plea based on a claim of innocence, any challenges to the underlying factual basis for the plea, any type
of direct or collateral appeal” waived “any right to DNA testing of that evidence or court action to pursue such tests.” State v. Bembenek, 724 N.W.2d
685, 686 n.2, 691 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
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constitutionality of waivers under Osborne, and then moves to
the broader principles of criminal waiver and the “knowing and
voluntary” requirement. Finally, this Part considers how the
principles explored will apply to different hypothetical DNA
waiver scenarios and how criminal defendants will be able to
challenge these waivers after the fact, if at all.
A. WHETHER DNA WAIVERS ARE PER SE INVALID
No court has yet determined whether criminal defendants
may validly waive their right to DNA testing through plea bar83
gains, and only a limited number of states have addressed the
84
85
question through legislation. California, West Virginia, and
86
Wyoming have preemptively declared waivers of DNA testing
rights in plea bargains (or generally) invalid. Colorado and
South Dakota, on the other hand, follow the federal Innocence
Protection Act by specifically allowing waivers of the “right to
preservation of DNA evidence . . . at any stage of the proceed83. Courts have, however, noted the existence of DNA waivers in addressing other issues. See, e.g., Smocks v. United States, Nos. 09-0635-CV-W-FJG;
08-00108-01-CR-W-FJG, 2010 WL 1332011, at *6 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2010) (describing how an attorney explained to his client that he would be “waiving his
constitutional rights, appellate and post-conviction rights . . . and the right to
request DNA testing of any biological evidence which may have been obtained
by law enforcement” in agreeing to a plea); Reese v. United States, Criminal
No. 08-16, Civil No. 09-709, 2009 WL 3286903, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2009)
(“[T]he written plea agreement required . . . [the defendant] to ‘acknowledge
responsibility for the conduct charged’ . . . and waive former jeopardy or double jeopardy claims, post-conviction DNA testing and the preservation of evidence for same.”); United States v. Holliday, No. 5:08CR39-01, 2008 WL
4700660, at *2 (N.D. W.Va. Oct. 21, 2008) (explaining that at the plea hearing,
“the United States reviewed the terms of the plea agreement, including,
among other things, that the defendant was pleading guilty to Count
One . . . and that he was waiving his appellate and post-conviction rights, his
right to have a jury make factual determinations, and his right to raise the
issue of DNA testing”); United States v. Akomah, No. 06CR1096(LAP), 2007
WL 4245841, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2007) (noting that the lower court “specifically referred the defendant to a number of key provisions of the plea
agreement-including . . . the waiver of the right to DNA testing—and the defendant indicated that he recalled each of these terms being in the plea
agreement”).
84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(m) (West 2011) (“Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the right to file a motion for postconviction DNA testing provided by this section is absolute and shall not be waived. This prohibition applies to, but is not limited to, a waiver that is given as part of an agreement
resulting in a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.”).
85. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-14 (m) (LexisNexis 2009) ( providing language nearly identical to that of the California code).
86. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-312(a) (2011) ( providing language nearly
identical to that of the California code).
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ing,” provided the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Similarly,
North Carolina dictates that the duty to preserve may only be
88
waived in a court proceeding.
Despite the lack of cases addressing the issue directly, the
weight of precedent in similar contexts suggests that, with limited exceptions, the waivers will be generally enforceable so
long as they are knowing and voluntary. Criminal defendants
have challenged a range of other waivers contained within plea
89
bargains and have nearly always failed. Courts allow defendants to give up a wide variety of core constitutional and statutory rights in plea bargains, and it is unlikely that rights to
postconviction DNA testing will receive different treatment.
1. Osborne
Because it is the key opinion on the right to DNA testing,
the discussion of DNA waivers begins with District Attorney’s
90
Office v. Osborne. The Court in Osborne held that there is no
91
substantive due process right to DNA testing. The Court did,
however, recognize that Osborne had a state-created “liberty
interest in demonstrating his innocence with new evidence under state law,” and that this right could “in some circumstances, beget yet other rights to procedures essential to the realiza-

87. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-1106(2) (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5B1 (Supp. 2011) (“Upon a written motion by any person who has been convicted
of a felony offense, the court that entered the judgment of conviction for the
felony offense shall order DNA testing of specific evidence if the court finds
that all of the following apply: . . . the petitioner did not: (i) Knowingly and
voluntarily waive the right to request DNA testing of that evidence in a court
proceeding . . . .”).
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-268 (a)(5) (2009) (“The duty to preserve may
not be waived knowingly and voluntarily by a defendant, without a court proceeding.”). The District of Columbia requires, under certain circumstances, a
court to inform an accused that he may waive—prior to making a plea—both
the right to independent DNA testing (where the state has already tested the
evidence) and other general DNA testing where the biological evidence has not
been tested, and to inform an accused of the potential evidentiary value of the
DNA evidence and the consequences of waiver. If a defendant then waives the
right to pre conviction testing, he is not eligible for post-conviction testing unless he is otherwise entitled to have the conviction set aside. D.C. CODE § 224132( b) (LexisNexis 2010).
89. Cf. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 72 (1904) (“When there is no
constitutional or statutory mandate, and no public policy prohibiting, an accused may waive any privilege which he is given the right to enjoy.”).
90. 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
91. Id. at 2322 (concluding “in the circumstances of this case, that there is
no . . . substantive due process right”).
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92

tion of the parent right.” The Court rejected extending the
preconviction procedural due process framework to the
postconviction context, holding that “the question is whether
consideration of Osborne’s claim within the framework of the
State’s procedures for postconviction relief ‘offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental,’ or ‘transgresses any
93
recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation.’”
The question under Osborne, then, is whether allowing DNA
waivers would cause a DNA testing procedure to fail this test.
There is little doubt that it would not. As discussed in more detail below, the Court has allowed many fundamental rights to
94
be waived, not least the right to a trial; a different result is
unlikely for the testing right. Moreover, in holding that Alaska’s postconviction procedures passed this test, the Court noted
that in order to access DNA evidence under Alaska law, that
95
evidence must be, inter alia, “diligently pursued”; waiving the
chance to test evidence is hardly diligent pursuit. Osborne presents no barrier to the enforceability of DNA waivers, so it is
necessary to look to the Supreme Court’s criminal waiver
jurisprudence.
2. Mezzanatto and Hill
Courts addressing waivers of rights in plea bargains begin
96
with a “presumption of waivability” that extends even to the
97
“most fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution.”
The recent Supreme Court cases addressing this presumption
merit a detailed review; these decisions, building upon a series
of older waiver cases, clarify the test that will apply to the validity of DNA waivers. In United States v. Mezzanatto, the Supreme Court observed that for a “broad array of constitutional
and statutory provisions, [r]ather than deeming waiver presumptively unavailable absent some sort of express enabling
92. Id. at 2319 (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 2320 (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446, 448
(1992)).
94. See Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 831–
33 (2003) (contrasting the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions with the
much more permissive doctrine of criminal waiver).
95. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320. The Court later observed that the testing
Osborne sought had been available at trial “and the state court relied on that
fact in denying him testing under Alaska law.” Id. at 2321.
96. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 202 (1995).
97. Id. at 201.
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clause, we instead have adhered to the opposite presumption.”
In Mezzanatto, undercover police agents caught the defendant
99
selling drugs, and the prosecutor subsequently entered into
plea negotiations with him, with an agreement that if he was
not entirely truthful during the negotiations, his statements
100
could be used as impeaching evidence at trial. Negotiations
broke down when the defendant made inconsistent state101
ments, and at trial the prosecution cross-examined the defendant using his inconsistent statements from the negotiation
102
process.
On appeal, the issue was whether Mezzanatto could “waive
the protection of the rules barring the use of plea negotiation
103
statements for impeachment,” which the Ninth Circuit decided he could not, looking “to the broader context of the criminal
104
justice system” and the role of plea bargains within this system, and noting that “[t]o allow waiver of these rules would be
contrary to all that Congress intended to achieve” and that allowing waiver “could easily have a chilling effect on the entire
105
plea bargaining process.” The court, in other words, focused
on the systemic effects of waiver. In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis was “directly contrary” to the Court’s approach to
106
waivers of many other statutory and constitutional rights.
The Court focused on its past decisions on waivability, noting
that the “most fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution” may be waived, including rights against double jeopardy and self-incrimination and rights to jury trial, confronta107
tion, and counsel.
As the Court explained, an equal presumption of
waivability applies to statutory rights “absent some affirmative
98. Id. at 200–01.
99. Id. at 197–98.
100. Id. at 198.
101. Id. at 199.
102. Id.
103. United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1454 (9th Cir. 1993),
(discussing FED. R. EVID. 410 and FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6)) rev’d 513 U.S. 196
(1995)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1455.
106. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 200.
107. Id. at 201 (citing Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) (waiver of
double jeopardy); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (waiver of
rights against “compulsory self-incrimination” and rights to jury trial and confrontation); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (right to counsel)).
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indication of Congress’s intent to preclude waiver” or an express waiver provision that suggested “that Congress intended
to occupy the field and to preclude waiver under other, unstat108
ed circumstances.” The Court then cited to an array of evidentiary rules that had been validly waived through plea
109
agreements in the past, and it determined that, in light of the
“background presumption” in favor of waivability, Mezzanatto
had the burden of “identifying some affirmative basis for concluding that the plea-statement Rules depart from the pre110
Mezzanatto put forth three bases for denying
sumption.”
waivability, arguing that rules that “guarantee . . . fair proce111
dure” may not be waived, that waiver was “fundamentally inconsistent” with the goals of the rules (to encourage voluntary
112
settlement), and that more generally, “waiver agreements
should be forbidden because they invite prosecutorial over113
reaching and abuse.” The Court disagreed with all three of
these arguments, establishing some clear principles for future
114
waiver decisions.
With respect to concerns about waivers denying fair procedures, the Court conceded that some waivers may occasionally
go too far. Those waivers that risk “irreparably ‘discredit[ing]
115
the federal courts’” by, for example, allowing “‘trial by 12
116
117
orangutans’” or conflicted counsel, are likely unenforceable.
In defining the types of waivers that tend to overly detract from
fair procedures and thus could cause “institutional harm to the
118
federal courts,” the Court focused on the “truth-seeking function of trials” (a function that might be substantially affected
119
by a jury of orangutans or a conflicted attorney). It concluded
that waiver in Mezzanatto’s case “enhances the truth-seeking

108. Id.
109. Id. at 202 (citing waivers admitting hearsay and to admit documentary and other evidence).
110. Id. at 203–04.
111. Id. at 204.
112. Id. at 206.
113. Id. at 209.
114. Id. at 204 –09.
115. Id. at 204 (alteration in original) (citing 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039, at
207–08 (1977)).
116. Id. (citing United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1985)).
117. Id. (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162 (1988)).
118. Id. at 205.
119. Id. at 204.
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function of trials and will result in more accurate verdicts”
because it makes the jury aware of inconsistent statements by
121
the testifying defendant.
Second, addressing Mezzanatto’s concern that waiver of
the rules subverted the rules’ goals by discouraging voluntary
122
settlement—a concern also expressed by the Ninth Circuit —
the Court refused to decide whether or when “public policy”
considerations such as chilling the plea bargaining process
123
could ever justify overriding the “presumption of waivability.”
Instead, it determined that, in any case, waiver of the right at
issue might even encourage plea bargaining, and relatedly, that
prohibiting waiver might cause prosecutors to “decline to enter
124
into cooperation discussions in the first place.”
Finally, addressing the contention that waiver agreements
generally should be “forbidden” due to potential prosecutorial
125
abuse, the Court relied on its decision in Newton v. Rumery.
In Newton, the Court considered whether all agreements in
which a criminal defendant releases his right to file an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in return for dismissal of pending criminal charges were void as against public policy because they
126
could lead to trumped up charges and suppressed evidence.
Rejecting a per se rule (while acknowledging that some agreements may not be informed and voluntary), a plurality of the
Court stated that “the mere opportunity to act improperly does
not compel an assumption that all—or even a significant number of—release-dismissal agreements stem from prosecutor[ial
127
misconduct.]” Building on Newton, the Mezzanatto Court held
that “[t]he mere potential for abuse of prosecutorial bargaining
power is an insufficient basis for foreclosing negotiation alto128
gether.” Rather, the Court determined that defendants could
counter abuse in individual cases (by arguing that there was
coercion in inducing the waiver agreement), and that “absent
120. Id.
121. Id. at 205.
122. United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
123. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 206–07.
124. Id. at 206.
125. Id. at 210 (citing Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987)).
126. The Court answered “this question by reference to traditional common-law principles, as [it had] resolved other questions about the principles
governing § 1983 actions.” Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392
(1987).
127. Id. at 397.
128. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210.
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some affirmative indication that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, an agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions of the plea-statement Rules is valid and
129
enforceable.”
The Court in New York v. Hill further elaborated upon this
130
waiver test. In Hill, the respondent was in custody in Ohio,
131
and officials in New York wished to charge him. The officials
therefore filed a detainer under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (IAD), which creates “procedures for resolution of
one State’s outstanding charges against a prisoner of another
132
133
State” and requires a timely trial after a defendant has
134
made a “request for a final disposition.” During a scheduling
hearing in open court, the prosecutor requested a later trial
date (as permitted by the IAD), and Hill’s attorney stated that
a trial date (which happened to be beyond the required time pe135
riod under the IAD) would be “fine.” Hill moved to dismiss
136
the indictment, arguing a lack of timeliness, and the trial
court denied his request, citing Hill’s counsel’s waiver of timely
137
trial. The New York Court of Appeals ultimately ordered the
indictment to be dismissed on the grounds that Hill had not

129. Id.
130. Although the waiver agreed to in Hill was not part of a plea agreement, this distinction does not appear to matter after Mezzanatto, at least in
dicta. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000). In a footnote in Mezzanatto, the Court
noted that Mezzanatto argued that pretrial agreements to waive were unlike
waiver agreements made while the “case is in progress.” The Court noted:
While it may be true that extrajudicial contracts made prior to litigation trigger closer judicial scrutiny than stipulations made within the
context of litigation there is nothing extrajudicial about the waiver
agreement at issue here. The agreement was made in the course of a
plea discussion aimed at resolving the specific criminal case that was
“in progress” against respondent.
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 203 n.3 (citing 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH
W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039, at 207–08
(1977)).
131. Hill, 528 U.S. at 112.
132. Id. at 111 (citing 18 U.S.C. app. 2 § 2 (1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 580.20 ( McKinney 1995); UNIF. POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, 11A
U.L.A. 48 (1995)).
133. Id. at 112 (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 580.20, Art. III(a)
( McKinney 1995)).
134. Id. (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 580.20, Art. III(a) ( McKinney
1995)).
135. Id. at 112–13.
136. Id. at 113.
137. Id.
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waived his “speedy trial rights under the IAD.”
On appeal, the Supreme Court began by noting that the
IAD statute does not include a waiver provision for the trial
timing requirements, but emphasized the presumption of
139
waivability laid out in Mezzanatto. Hill raised two objections
to allowing waiver. First, he argued that “by explicitly providing for the grant of ‘good-cause continuances,’ the IAD seeks to
limit the situations in which delay is permitted, and that permitting other extensions of the time period would override
140
those limitations.” The Court took a more accommodating
stance toward “policy” arguments than it had in Mezzanatto,
acknowledging that “waiver is not appropriate when it is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought to be se141
cured.” The Court emphasized, however, the high burden of
proof faced by a defendant who argues that waiver is inconsistent with the instrument that is creating the right: as established by Mezzanatto, the defendant must make an “affirmative
142
indication of Congress’s intent to preclude waiver.” Because
the “good-cause continuances” provided for in the IAD were not
intended to address agreed-upon extensions, “the negative impli143
cation” was “certainly not clear enough” to meet this burden.
Second, Hill argued that “the IAD benefits not only the defendant but society generally, and that the defendant may not
144
waive society’s rights.” The Court again conceded that, as it
had previously recognized, a “‘right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory poli145
cy.’” But the Court emphasized that “[i]t is not true that any
146
private right that also benefits society cannot be waived.” Rather, it found that litigants within the system typically protect
147
and in the case of trials of alreadythe public’s rights,
detained defendants under the IAD, the benefits of “prompt tri-

138. Id.
139. Id. at 114.
140. Id. at 116.
141. Id.
142. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995); see Hill, 528
U.S. at 116.
143. Hill, 528 U.S. at 116.
144. Id.
145. Id. (citing Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945)).
146. Id. at 117.
147. Id.

976

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:952

148

al” are less relevant. Besides, the Court noted, the public’s interest in prompt trial, partially embodied within the IAD, was
149
not “unalterable statutory policy.”
After finding the waiver of the IAD’s rights to a timely trial
to be generally valid, the court lastly addressed what was required for Hill to waive the right in this particular case. The
Court noted here that “[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on
150
the nature of the right at issue.” The Court observed, for example, that a “defendant must personally make an informed
waiver” of “certain fundamental rights,” including the right to
151
152
counsel and the right to plead not guilty. It concluded that
this analysis should not turn on a “hypertechnical distinction,”
however, such as whether Hill had in fact made an “affirmative
153
request” to waive his rights. The agreement by Hill’s counsel
to a trial date inconsistent with the IAD’s time limits was
enough to constitute a waiver, and the waiver was validly
154
made.
Taken together, Hill and Mezzanatto pose a formidable
hurdle for a criminal defendant seeking to argue that his rights
are not waivable in the absence of a clear legislative statement
to that effect. Mezzanatto emphasizes the presumption that defendants may knowingly and voluntarily waive their constitutional and statutory rights and notes only very narrow public
155
policy and “court integrity” exceptions to this presumption.
Hill places a high bar on attempts to argue that a waiver un156
dermines the statutory right “sought to be secured” —
reemphasizing that an “affirmative indication” against waiver
157
must be found in the statute. Further, Hill makes clear that
where a defendant argues that a waiver is generally detrimental to society at-large, and thus against public policy, the
societal interest must likely be part of the statute’s “unaltera158
ble policy” to merit invalidation of a waiver. Finally, where a
defendant challenges the particular means by which the waiver
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id. (citing Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945)).
Id. at 114.
Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 –65 (1938)).
Id. (citing Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1966)).
Id. at 118.
Id.
See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
Hill, 528 U.S. at 116.
Id. (citing Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 201).
Id. at 117.
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was entered, the nature of the right matters: the more fundamental the right, the more procedure and voluntariness is re159
quired. As a result of the long chain of case law relied upon
by the court, as well as the Hill and Mezzanatto decisions
themselves, the Supreme Court is “decidedly inhospitable to
the notion that any agreement by a criminal defendant to
waive a right—either constitutional or statutory—could be pre160
sumptively against public policy.”
3. The Likely Validity of DNA Waivers
Applying these principles to DNA waivers, federal courts
are unlikely to accept arguments that they are invalid per se.
The question of per se validity is more difficult, however, in the
many states with postconviction DNA testing statutes that do
not explicitly contemplate waiver of the testing right.
a. Federal Courts
Initially, a defendant opposing a DNA waiver in federal
court could argue that Congress and the states, in granting
DNA testing, did not intend for defendants to waive this testing. This will be an extremely difficult task because, as previ161
ously noted, the Innocence Protection Act expressly antici162
This fact will largely foreclose the
pates DNA waivers.
163
otherwise promising argument, developed below, that Congress could not have intended to allow waiver because waiver is
164
inconsistent with the right being granted.
Nonetheless, a defendant could challenge DNA waivers on
broader “public policy” grounds. First, he could argue from
Mezzanatto that the waiver of DNA testing will discredit the
165
federal courts. This argument is definitely plausible: as will

159. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
160. Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 127, 160 (1995).
161. See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(3) (2006) (allowing DNA testing only where
the defendant did not “knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to request
DNA testing of that evidence in a court proceeding after the date of enactment
of the Innocence Protection Act of 2004”).
162. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
163. See infra Part II.A.3.b.
164. See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 116 (2000).
165. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204 (1995) (quoting 21
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5039, 207–08 (1977)).
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166

be addressed in greater detail below, allowing prosecutors to
prevent potentially conclusive evidence of innocence from coming to light will damage public confidence in the courts. And
Mezzanatto emphasized that plea statements can be admitted
as impeachment evidence at trial without “discrediting the federal courts” because impeaching evidence “enhances the truthseeking function of trials and will result in more accurate ver167
dicts.” But the Mezzanatto Court seemed leery of a “‘contract
168
to deprive the court of relevant testimony,’” which is exactly
analogous to the effect of a DNA waiver—particularly where
the waiver also allows the destruction of evidence. Unfortunately, however, the Court’s interest in accuracy at trial has not ex169
tended to the pretrial period, and DNA waivers, while perhaps
170
distasteful, are not as shocking as a jury of lower primates.
A defendant could also make a second public policy argument against DNA waivers—that DNA-testing statutes affect
the public interest, and allowing waiver contravenes statutory
policy. It is certainly true that society has an interest in testing: beyond freeing the innocent, testing often leads to the ap171
prehension of the actual perpetrator. This interest could be
thwarted by DNA waivers. But it may be difficult to say that
waiver truly contravenes statutory policy in light of the fact
that many testing statutes—mindful of the monetary and emotional costs to disturbing finality—already impose meaningful,
and sometimes insuperable, barriers to testing, including, inter
alia, “guilty plea exclusions, custody requirements, due diligence requirements, and requirements that the technology has
172
changed since the time of trial.” Enforcing waivers is entirely
consistent with this approach.
166. See infra notes 328–31 and accompanying text.
167. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204.
168. Id. (quoting Note, Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 HARV. L.
REV. 138, 142–43 (1933)); see also Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2080–81 (2000) (arguing that the Brady right, as a
structural right, “is simply not the defendant’s right to alienate” and that the
“recognition that such ‘structural protections’ are inalienable can be found in
cases cited by the Supreme Court in Mezzanatto”).
169. See infra notes 232–42 and accompanying text.
170. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204.
171. See, e.g., Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, THE INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_
DNA_Exonerations.php ( last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (“The true suspects and/or
perpetrators have been identified in 124 of the DNA exoneration cases.”).
172. Garrett, supra note 14, at 1680.
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Third, a defendant could argue that enforcing DNA waivers would create an unacceptable risk of police and prosecutorial misconduct, as waivers could be used to bar testing and dispose of the evidence of a host of misdeeds. But despite the
appeal of this approach, it is foreclosed by Mezzanatto and
Rumery, which squarely hold that the mere potential for mis173
use is insufficient to render a waiver per se invalid. There
are, in sum, strong public policy arguments to be made for opposing the use of waivers; these arguments will be considered
at greater length below. Some state courts, if presented with
the question, may be persuaded to hold DNA waivers generally
174
unenforceable. The Supreme Court, however, is unlikely to
find these arguments sufficiently compelling to overcome its affinity for waiver, and particularly for waivers in plea
agreements.
The conclusion that federal courts are unlikely to generally
invalidate DNA waivers is reinforced by the lower federal
courts’ approach to the waiver of rights similar to the right to
postconviction DNA testing and preservation: the right to appeal and to seek postconviction review through habeas. These
waivers, which are now commonplace, are analogous to DNA
waivers because they limit a defendant’s right to a form of postplea review. And in all three cases—for habeas, appeal, and
DNA waivers—a strong argument can be made that allowing
waiver is against public policy because it is inconsistent with
the purpose of the right itself (remedying error) and the potential for abuse by unscrupulous prosecutors seeking to cover up
175
wrongdoing. Nonetheless, while the Supreme Court has not
directly addressed the validity of these waivers, twelve circuit
176
courts of appeals have upheld appeal waivers, and habeas
waivers have “been accepted in all but one of the jurisdictions
177
(Indiana) that have considered them.” In refusing to create a
173. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210; Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S.
386, 397 (1987).
174. See infra notes 177, 183 and accompanying text (discussing states not
allowing appeal and habeas waivers).
175. See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d 11, 14 (1st Cir.
2008); United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990); see also FED.
R. CRIM. P. 11( b) (amended in 1999 to implicitly allow for appeal waivers,
providing that “[ b]efore the court accepts a plea of guilty . . . the court must
address the defendant personally in open court” and must inform the defendant of “the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal
or to collaterally attack the sentence,” among other rights surrendered).
177. Malani, supra note 67, at 12. The Supreme Court of Indiana held
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blanket ban on appeal and habeas waivers, lower courts have
relied on the same factors voiced in Mezzanatto and Hill. In
United States v. Wiggins, one of the earliest decisions to ad178
dress waiver of the right to appeal, the Fourth Circuit made a
typical observation: “[I]f defendants can waive fundamental
constitutional rights such as the right to counsel, or the right to
a jury trial, surely they are not precluded from waiving proce179
dural rights granted by statute.”
Similarly, courts have found appeal waivers to be generally
justifiable on public policy grounds. In United States v. Teeter,
the First Circuit concluded that public policy supports appeal
waivers for a number of reasons: “[A] defendant is unlikely to
waive this right unless she believes that some feature of a proffered plea agreement makes it worth her while to do so,” waivers offer a criminal defendant an “additional bargaining chip in
negotiations with the prosecution,” prosecutors might be unwilling to enter the plea bargaining process without waivers,
waivers preserve prosecutorial and judicial resources by limit180
ing baseless appeals and, relatedly, they support finality.
Turning to the argument that presentence appeal waivers
can never be “knowing” because the value of the right is unclear—that is, the defendant cannot know how useful the appellate right will be—the Teeter court’s approach is typical. After noting that an appeal waiver “typically embraces all
determinations later made by the sentencing court . . . some of
which may be quite different than either [the government or
181
the defendant] thought possible,” the court noted that criminal defendants may knowingly waive their rights, and in guilty
pleas—which waive “numerous rights”—defendants often give
up rights that could potentially arise in future events, such as a
jury trial. Thus, the “prospective nature” of waivers does not
182
“place them off limits” or make them unknowing.
waivers of postconviction review unenforceable in Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d
73, 76 (Ind. 2008).
178. See Blank, supra note 168, at 2030.
179. 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Clark, 865
F.2d 1433, 1437 (4th Cir. 1989)).
180. 257 F.3d 14, 22 (1st Cir. 2001).
181. Id. at 21; see also United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 830 (8th Cir.
1992) (“While Rutan may not have known the exact dimension of the sentence,
he knew he had a right to appeal his sentence and that he was giving up that
right.”), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d
886 (8th Cir. 2003).
182. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 21.
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The lower courts’ general acceptance of appeal and habeas
waivers reinforces the conclusion that DNA waivers are unlikely to be held per se invalid in most federal jurisdictions. Just as
courts addressing facial challenges to habeas and appeal waivers presume their validity despite the potential for mischief in
the plea bargaining process, DNA waivers will likely receive
similar treatment—particularly at the federal level.
b. State Courts
States have generally followed the federal courts in the
criminal waiver context—nearly all states to have considered
183
the issue, for example, enforce appeal and habeas waivers.
On this basis alone, it would seem likely that the great majority of states will also enforce DNA waivers. Significantly, however, most state statutes, unlike the federal Innocence Protection Act, do not explicitly contemplate waiver—only Colorado,
North Carolina, and South Dakota expressly allow defendants

183. At least one state, however, refuses to enforce appeal waivers on public policy grounds, and the policy reasons provided by other states that have
banned appeal and habeas waivers are similar. Arizona, which has banned
appeal waivers per se, has found that “public policy forbids a prosecutor from
insulating himself from review by bargaining away a defendant’s appeal
rights.” State v. Ethington, 592 P.2d 768, 769–70 (Ariz. 1979) (“We hold that
the right to appeal is not negotiable in plea bargaining, and that as a matter of
public policy a defendant will be permitted to bring a timely appeal from a
conviction notwithstanding an agreement not to appeal.”). Michigan, in previously banning appeal waivers, similarly worried about waivers’ “chilling effect
on the right to appeal.” People v. Butler, 204 N.W.2d 325, 330 ( Mich. Ct. App.
1972). Indiana, Michigan, and Arizona all invalidate appeal waivers, Malani,
supra note 67, at 14, but it appears that currently only Arizona invalidates
these waivers per se. See Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 75–76 (Ind. 2008)
(holding that a “defendant may waive the right to appellate review of his sentence as part of a written plea agreement” provided that the waiver is not “unintelligent or coerced” but disallowing waivers of postconviction relief ). After
People v. Butler, where the Michigan Court of Appeals described the right to
appeal as an “absolute right founded on a provision of our State Constitution”
and held that allowing “the prosecution to induce defendant to waive his right
to appeal in exchange for a plea agreement . . . is constitutionally impermissible,” 204 N.W.2d at 330, the court reversed itself. See People v. Rodriguez, 480
N.W.2d 287, 291 ( Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (“We find the position espoused in Butler . . . that the inclusion of the waiver of appeal in a plea agreement constitutes inherent coercion against the exercise of the right to appeal is at odds
with the widely accepted underpinnings of the plea bargaining system. While
it is an important right, the right to appeal is no more fundamental than the
right to a jury trial, which a defendant may waive by pleading guilty as long
as it is done knowingly and voluntarily.”). Indiana also now allows appellate
waivers. See Creech, 887 N.E.2d at 75–76.
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184

to waive DNA-testing rights. In the absence of clear evidence
of legislative intent to allow DNA waivers, the argument
against them becomes much stronger.
Extending the right to postconviction DNA testing to those
who pleaded guilty is somewhat counterintuitive and some185
The conventional wisdom, which still
times controversial.
claims a significant number of adherents, is that innocent peo186
ple do not plead guilty, or at least only exceedingly rarely.
Who, after all, would knowingly submit to undeserved punishment? Viewed from this perspective, not requiring conviction by
trial as a prerequisite to postconviction testing would be, at
187
best, a poor use of government resources.
As will be discussed in greater depth below, however, it is
well-established that, for a variety of reasons, innocent people
188
do plead guilty —and it requires little imagination to conclude
that, compared to pleading guilty, signing a DNA waiver is of189
ten a comparatively small step. Indeed, one thing that can be
said with certainty about innocent defendants who plead guilty
is that they have demonstrated a willingness to give up a
chance to contest guilt, typically in exchange for reduced pun-

184. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (describing Colorado’s,
North Carolina’s, and South Dakota’s anticipation of DNA waivers).
185. See, e.g., J.H. Dingfelder Stone, Facing the Uncomfortable Truth: The
Illogic of Post-Conviction DNA Testing for Individuals Who Pleaded Guilty, 45
U.S.F. L. REV. 47, 48–49 (2010) (arguing that defendants who pleaded guilty
should have no right to DNA testing); Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 50, at
562 n.51 (describing a prosecutor’s argument that allowing a defendant who
pleaded guilty to obtain testing and “‘rescind his or her plea’” would “‘make[ ] a
mockery of the criminal justice system’” (quoting Response Brief for Fla. Prosecuting Att’ys Ass’n, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 8, Amendment to Fla. Rules of
Criminal Procedure Creating Rule 3.853 (DNA Testing), 807 So. 2d 633 (Fla.
2001) (Nos. SC01-363 & SC01-1649), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/
flsupct/sc01-363/comment4.pdf).
186. See, e.g., Daina Borteck, Pleas for DNA Testing: Why Lawmakers
Should Amend State Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes to Apply to Prisoners Who Pled Guilty, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1429, 1433 (2004) (“Across society,
many people refuse to believe that a person would confess to a crime that he
did not commit, even though empirical data confirms that false confessions do
occur in the American criminal justice system.”); Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra
note 50, at 562–63 (describing the “unshakable belief in the accuracy of the
guilty verdict”).
187. See infra Part III.B.
188. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970) (recognizing
that innocents plead guilty); Schulhofer, supra note 13 (describing why innocents plead guilty); infra Part III.A.
189. See infra Part III.A.
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ishment. Therefore, as a matter of legislative intent, it
seems implausible that a legislature, having recognized this
problem, and having taken the extraordinary step of creating a
statutory right to postconviction testing in order to address it,
would choose to allow its chosen remedy to be undermined by
the very factors underlying the problem itself. Or to put the argument into the Mezzanatto/Hill framework, allowing waiver is
so clearly “inconsistent with the provision creating the right
192
sought to be secured” as to amount to an “affirmative indica193
tion of [legislative] intent to preclude waiver.”
Despite this argument’s considerable appeal, however, history suggests it will not enjoy wide success. Too often, the
courts have failed to recognize—or adapt to—DNA’s unique
194
properties and potential. Indeed, the very existence of fifty
DNA statutes reflects, in part, courts’ unwillingness or inability
195
to accommodate testing. This trend, combined with the widespread acceptance of appeal waivers, strongly suggests that
courts will enforce DNA waivers even in the absence of express
legislative intent to allow them.
B. INDIVIDUAL CHALLENGES TO DNA WAIVERS
Even if DNA waivers are not per se invalid, individual
waivers of these rights may be unenforceable. Possible challenges include contending that the waiver was not knowing and
voluntary, that enforcing it would be a “miscarriage of justice,”
and that the entire plea should be withdrawn due to ineffective
190. See Schulhofer, supra note 13.
191. See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 116 (2000) (acknowledging that in
some cases, allowing waivers could subvert legislative intent); United States v.
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 207 (1995) (making a similar acknowledgment).
192. Hill, 528 U.S. at 116.
193. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 201.
194. See, e.g., Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1295–96 (2011) (describing Texas courts’ and the Fifth Circuit’s consistent refusals to grant DNA testing under Texas’s testing statute); Dist. Atty’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct.
2308, 2314 –16 (2009) (describing a similar history of testing denials in Alaska); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 61–62
(2008) (describing how, in the cases of innocent defendants ultimately exonerated by DNA, courts consistently denied relief ); Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging Decision and the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2201–04 (2010) (describing problems with
prosecutorial tunnel vision and confirmation bias following the filing of
charges).
195. Cf. Medwed, supra note 5, at 675–86 (describing the numerous hurdles to newly discovered evidence claims—those required for access to DNA
testing before testing statutes created legislative rights to access).
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assistance of counsel or, perhaps, a Brady v. United States vio196
lation. This Section explores these potential individual challenges to DNA waivers. (Of course, many DNA waivers include
language allowing the prosecutor to destroy the DNA evidence—in these cases, a challenge would have to be made very
quickly to be effective.)
1. The Knowing and Voluntary Requirement
Courts’ general treatment of appellate and habeas waivers,
which presumes them to be valid in the absence of certain limited exceptions, will likely inform courts’ consideration of DNA
waivers when and if they are challenged. Looking to
Mezzanatto and Hill, courts will recognize the presumptive validity of waivers and, in the individual case, look to the nature
197
of the right to determine what suffices for waiver. Because
the right to DNA testing is similar to the right to appeal and to
habeas review, courts will likely rely upon decisions addressing
the knowing and voluntary requirement for waiver of those
rights prior to the 1999 amendments to the Rules of Criminal
198
Procedure, which largely ended the debate over necessary
procedure for waivers by requiring courts to inform defendants
that they were waiving an appeal or a right to a collateral attack
199
on a sentence before accepting defendants’ plea bargains.
To generally enter a plea knowingly and voluntarily, the
defendant must be “aware of the nature of the charges against
200
him, including the elements” of the . . . charge,” and that defendant must have chosen “among the alternative courses of ac201
tion open” to him. In investigating the voluntariness of a
plea, the courts look to “all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it,” such as the strength of a case against a defendant,
and “the possibility of a heavier sentence following a guilty
202
verdict after a trial.” A prosecutor’s revealing this type of information to a defendant does not create an involuntary plea.
Rather, “the agents of the State may not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion over196. See 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
197. Hill, 528 U.S. at 114.
198. See United States v. Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 2008).
199. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11( b)(1)(N) (2010). As yet, there is no specific provision in the federal rules requiring courts to inform a defendant during the plea
colloquy that he is giving up DNA testing right.
200. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 182–83 (2005).
201. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
202. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970).
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203

bearing the will of the defendant.” As the Court in Brady recognized, involuntariness may also arise where the defendant
“was so gripped by fear of the death penalty or hope of leniency
that he did not or could not, with the help of counsel, rationally
weigh the advantages of going to trial against the advantages
204
of pleading guilty.”
In the appeal waiver context—prior to the 1999 amendments—courts generally imposed a similar requirement for a
205
waiver to be knowing and voluntary. An appeal waiver was
knowing and voluntary, for example, where a court alerted the

203. Id. at 750.
204. Id.
205. Since 1999, whether a waiver of an appeal or habeas right is “knowing
and voluntary” is partially defined by statute. Rule 11( b) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure requires a court entering the plea to inform the defendant in open court of “the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the
right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.” FED. R. CRIM.
P. 11( b)(1)(N) (2010). Since the addition of this rule in 1999, courts have generally found that a failure to inform the defendant of the appeal waiver results
in the invalidation of the waiver in the plea. See, e.g., United States v. Smith,
618 F.3d 657, 664 –65 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding, on plain error review, that an
appeal waiver was unenforceable when the court had “only obliquely” referred
to the defendant’s appeal waiver under the Rule 11 colloquy); United States v.
Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 26–27 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding where a court did not “direct” the defendant’s “attention to the waiver provision” as required under
Rule 11, severing “the waiver of appellate rights from the remainder of the
plea agreement . . . .”). When the defendant fails to preserve the Rule
11( b)(1)(N) claim, courts generally apply the plain error standard, requiring
the defendant to show “a reasonable probability that he would not have entered the plea had the error not been made.” U.S. v. Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d
11, 14 (1st Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002)
(holding that “a silent defendant has the burden to satisfy the plain-error
rule”). “However, the court is not required to conduct a specific dialogue with
the defendant concerning the appeal waiver, so long as the record contains sufficient evidence to determine whether the defendant’s acceptance of the waiver
was knowing and voluntary.” Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th
Cir. 1999). Further, even where a court has not provided the proper Rule 11
information to the defendant, courts will sometimes affirm appeal and habeas
waivers so long as they were knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., United States v.
Lara-Joglar, 400 F. App’x 565, 570 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.
Ward, 518 F.3d 75, 82 (1st Cir. 2008)) (validating an appeal waiver and determining that “[a]lthough Rule 11 does require the court to ‘address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary,’
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11( b)(2) (2010) . . . even that general inquiry is not constitutionally mandated.”) ; United States v. Polak, 573 F.3d 428, 431–32 (7th Cir.
2009) (affirming an appeal waiver on plain error review where the court had
failed to ask about the defendant’s “understanding” of that waiver but the defendant had, among other factors indicating knowledge, “gone over the agreement with his attorney” and signed the agreement below a statement indicating that he had “reviewed all aspects of the plea”).
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defendant in court that as part of the plea agreement, “‘defendant . . . expressly waives the right to appeal his sentence on any
ground’” and the plea language itself stated, “‘Realizing the uncertainty in estimating what sentence he will ultimately receive, the defendant knowingly waives his right to appeal the
sentence . . . in exchange for the concessions made by the gov206
ernment in this agreement.’” Similarly, where a court warned
a defendant of the constitutional rights that he was giving up
in a plea, the plea and the appeal waiver within the plea were
made knowingly and voluntarily because the defendant “knew
he was giving up possible appeals, even if he did not know ex207
actly what the nature of those appeals might be.”
Many DNA waivers contain very specific text describing
the nature of the right given up, and courts will likely generally
find them valid. Even the shortest DNA waiver found in any of
the plea agreements investigated in this Article states that the
client is waiving “any and all rights” that he “may have, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3600, to require DNA testing of any physical
evidence” and that the evidence will be unavailable for testing
208
in the future. This certainly informs the defendant of the nature of the appeals that he is giving up (by referring specifically
to the DNA testing provision), and it at least generally alerts
him to the existence of DNA evidence. Other DNA waivers are
even more explicit—describing, for example, the specific hair
209
and blood samples available in the case, warning that the defendant is “giving up any ability to request DNA testing of evidence in this case in the current proceeding, in any proceeding
after conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 3600, and in any proceeding
210
of any type,” and informing the defendant that “by giving up
this right, the defendant will never have another opportunity to
have the evidence in the case submitted to DNA testing, or to
employ the results of DNA testing to support a claim that de211
fendant is innocent.” Assuming the defendant has actually

206. United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990) (omissions in
original) (internal citation omitted).
207. United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir. 1990).
208. Plea Agreement at 6, United States v. Bloch, No. 10-cr-215-M-01 (Apr.
27, 210).
209. See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 11, United States v. McPike, No. 0530069-WDS ( May 6, 2009).
210. Plea Agreement at 5, United States v. James, No. SA CR 05-214 -CJC
(Dec. 14, 2007).
211. Id.
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read and understood these provisions, waiver is very likely
knowing and voluntary.
If the DNA waiver is found to be knowing and voluntary, a
defendant challenging the validity of the waiver will have to
fall back on other factors, including, at least in some courts, an
argument that the denial of waiver would work individual injustice in the case.
2. The Miscarriage of Justice Exception
Some federal courts invalidate appeal and habeas waivers
where they result in a “miscarriage of justice.” The First Circuit
has noted, for example, that because appeal “waivers are made
before any manifestation of sentencing error emerges, appellate
courts must remain free to grant relief from them in egregious
212
213
cases” —where a “miscarriage of justice occurs.” This principle is distinct from the public policy arguments that could
214
cause waivers of some rights to be invalid on their face. A
miscarriage of justice, unlike a public policy violation, arises in
individual cases when enforcing a waiver would lead to a result
the court finds unacceptable, such as, in the appeal waiver con215
text, leaving in place a racially motivated sentence.
Whether a court’s refusal to withdraw or sever a waiver
will result in a miscarriage of justice is determined by
the clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it concerns a fact issue, a sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum),
the impact of the error on the defendant, the impact of correcting the
error on the government, and the extent to which the defendant ac216
quiesced in the result.

The Eighth Circuit, for example, has found a miscarriage of
justice where the district court imposed an “illegal sentence,”
which is a sentence “not authorized by the judgment of conviction” or “greater or less than the permissible statutory penalty
217
for the crime.” The Tenth Circuit similarly finds a miscarriage of justice where “the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum,” where “the district court relied on an impermissible factor such as race,” where the defendant received ineffective
212. United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 2001).
213. Id. at 26.
214. See supra notes 96–154 and accompanying text (discussing
Mezzanatto’s and Hill’s approach to the permissibility of waiver).
215. See infra notes 216–19 and accompanying text.
216. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 26.
217. United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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assistance of counsel in the negotiation of the waiver, and
218
“where the waiver is otherwise unlawful.” The Tenth Circuit
also finds a miscarriage of justice where the waiver is the result
219
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Other circuits have found
that enforcing appeal waivers would result in a miscarriage of
220
justice in a variety of these same circumstances.
If this doctrine is taken unaltered from the appeal waiver
context, it would, for obvious reasons, have little application to
DNA waivers. Courts may, however, adapt it to the DNA waiver context. Indeed, because of DNA waivers’ considerable potential to lead to injustice, such a development would be highly
desirable. For example, a miscarriage of justice may exist
where the defendant could show that the existence of the evidence was deliberately suppressed (even if this would not violate due process under Brady, as described in Part 3.a below),
or where the defendant is able to independently demonstrate
compelling proof of innocence, such as a credible confession by a
third party, which could be verified by DNA testing. Courts’
willingness to extend this principle to DNA waivers is, of
course, entirely speculative.
3. Withdrawing the Plea
In addition to arguing that a DNA waiver itself was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily or that enforcement of
the waiver will result in a miscarriage of justice, a defendant
wishing to challenge the validity of a DNA waiver may also
seek to withdraw the entire plea. The test for determining the
validity of a guilty plea is “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of ac221
tion open to the defendant.” A full exploration of the factors
rendering a plea invalid, such as, for example, ineffective assis-

218. United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1327 (10th Cir. 2004).
219. Id.
220. Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1999) (“We have
recognized that the right to appeal survives where the agreement is involuntary, or the trial court relied on a constitutionally impermissible factor (such
as race), or (as the waiver here specifically provides) the sentence exceeded the
statutory maximum.”); United States v. Schuman, 127 F.3d 815 n.* (9th Cir.
1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring) ( per curiam) ( listing the circumstances where
an appeal waiver may be invalid, including sentencing based on race, illegal
sentences, breaches of plea agreements, and disparity of sentences among
codefendants).
221. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
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222

tance of counsel, is impossible. Because of its special relevance to the topic, however, one type of possible claim is worth
223
addressing: the Brady violation.
a. Brady Violations
Defendants who have signed DNA waivers may seek to
withdraw the plea itself by claiming that prosecutors failed to
disclose potentially exculpatory evidence prior to eliciting a
224
waiver of the right to test this evidence. Like a Strickland
225
challenge to a guilty plea, a Brady challenge must assert that
the failure to disclose affected the plea itself; all other constitutional challenges, after all, are surrendered in entering the
226
guilty plea. A somewhat extended discussion of the applica222. See United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting
that “the term ‘miscarriage of justice’ is more a concept than a constant,” and
that “[o]ther considerations will doubtless suggest themselves in specific cases”).
223. A challenge to the plea itself will be much more likely to succeed on
direct appeal than it will through collateral attack. See Bousley v. United
States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (“We have strictly limited the circumstances
under which a guilty plea may be attacked on collateral review. It is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person,
who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.
Even the voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea can be attacked on collateral review only if first challenged on direct review.” (quoting Mabry v.
Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984))).
224. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) ( plurality opinion) (finding that favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, “only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different”); id. at 685 (White, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)
(“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
225. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 53, 57–60 (1985) (applying Strickland’s
ineffective assistance of counsel test to a plea challenge); cf. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984) (holding that a convicted defendant must show that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness” and that “there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different”).
226. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (holding that following a guilty plea, a defendant “may not thereafter raise independent claims
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the
entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent
character of the guilty plea”); United States. v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 178 (5th
Cir. 2009) (finding that “a guilty plea precludes the defendant from asserting a
Brady violation”).
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tion of Brady to the pretrial period is merited in light of its implications for DNA waivers. As the right to pretrial discovery
decreases, DNA waivers potentially become both more troubling and more difficult to challenge.
A number of federal and state courts have historically recognized pretrial Brady due process rights. In a comprehensive
survey of the cases, Kevin McMunigal identified three circuits,
one federal district court, and eight state appellate courts that
found a “due process duty to disclose Brady material prior to
227
the entry of a guilty plea.” Prosecutors generally had to provide not only exculpatory evidence “going to the heart of the defendant’s guilt or innocence,” but also “evidence that is useful
for impeachment, i.e., having the potential to alter the jury’s
assessment of the credibility of a significant prosecution wit228
ness.” Importantly, this disclosure obligation was generally
“pertinent not only to an accused’s preparation for trial but also
229
to his determination of whether or not to plead guilty.” Indeed, Brady made clear that “suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process” where such evidence is material, regardless of whether
230
the prosecutor suppressed the evidence in good or bad faith.
Only one federal court of appeals—the Fifth Circuit—and sev231
eral state courts had denied the pretrial Brady right.
A 2002 Supreme Court decision substantially changed this
landscape. In United States v. Ruiz, the Court held that “the
Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence,” or any information regarding any
affirmative defense, “prior to entering a plea agreement with a
232
criminal defendant.” In reaching this conclusion, the Court
observed that a guilty plea could be voluntary without these
disclosures because “impeachment information is special in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a plea
233
is voluntary.” Moreover, a defendant need not know exactly
what impeachment information he would receive at trial before
giving up the right to that information because “the law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

McMunigal, supra note 41, at 653.
United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1988).
Id.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (emphasis added).
McMunigal, supra note 41, at 653–54.
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).
Id. at 628.
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aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the
right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances—even though the defendant may not know the specific
234
detailed consequences of invoking it.” The Court found it
“particularly difficult to characterize impeachment information
as critical information of which the defendant must always be
aware prior to pleading guilty,” because its importance depends
on the defendant’s knowledge of the strength and contents of
235
the prosecutor’s potential case.
The Court in Ruiz also found no relevant distinction between ignorance of impeachment evidence and the many other
types of ignorance, such as ignorance of the strength of the
state’s case or the admissibility of a confession the Court had
236
sanctioned in the past. Finally, weighing the value of the as237
serted right against the cost to the government’s interest, the
Court concluded that the Brady right would be of little value to
defendants in the plea process, noting that “in any case, as the
proposed plea agreement at issue here specifies, the Government will provide ‘any information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant,’” and that “[t]hat fact, along with
[Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11] diminishes the force of
Ruiz’s concern that, in the absence of impeachment information, innocent individuals, accused of crimes, will plead
238
guilty.” It then described the heavy burdens that a right to
pre-plea impeachment evidence would place on prosecutors,
worrying that it “could seriously interfere with the Government’s interest in securing those guilty pleas that are factually
239
justified” and could “force the Government to abandon its
general practice of not disclosing to a defendant pleading guilty
information that would reveal the identities of cooperating informants, undercover investigators, or other prospective wit240
nesses.” The Court noted that “most (though not all) of the
reasons” given for refusing to recognize a preguilty plea right to
disclosure of impeachment information applied to information
234. Id.
235. Id. at 630.
236. Id. at 631.
237. Id. (“[D]ue process considerations include not only (1) the nature of the
private interest at stake, but also (2) the value of the additional safeguard,
and (3) the adverse impact of the requirement upon the Government’s interests.” (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985))).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 632 (internal quotations omitted).
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241

Notably, Justice
regarding affirmative defenses as well.
Thomas concurred in the judgment on the grounds that Brady
242
does not apply at all at the plea stage.
The extent to which the logic of Ruiz applies to exculpatory
information is unclear, and the issue has split the courts of appeals. A number of subsequent decisions suggest that Ruiz
should be limited to its narrow impeachment-based holding,
and some have even held that Ruiz implies a right to pre-plea
243
“factual evidence of innocence.” In McCann v. Mangialardi,
for example, the Seventh Circuit determined that where prosecutors fail to disclose exonerating evidence prior to a guilty
plea, “Ruiz strongly suggests that a Brady-type disclosure
244
might be required under the circumstances” because exculpa245
tory evidence is “entirely different.” It concluded that “Ruiz
indicates a significant distinction between impeachment information and exculpatory evidence of actual innocence” and that,
therefore, “it is highly likely that the Supreme Court would find
a violation of the Due Process Clause if prosecutors or other
relevant government actors have actual knowledge of a criminal defendant’s factual innocence but fail to disclose such in246
formation to a defendant before he enters into a guilty plea.”

241. Id. at 633.
242. Id. at 633–34 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The principle supporting
Brady was ‘avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.’ That concern is not
implicated at the plea stage . . . .” (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963))).
243. Compare In re Miranda, 182 P.3d 513, 542–43 (Cal. 2008) (“Ruiz by its
terms applies only to material impeachment evidence, and the high court emphasized that the government there had agreed to ‘provide any information
establishing the factual innocence of the defendant’ regardless.’”), with Ollins
v. O’Brien, No. 03 C 5795, 03 C 7175, 2005 WL 730987, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
28, 2005) (holding that “due process requires the disclosure of information of
factual innocence during the plea bargaining process”).
244. 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 788. The Tenth Circuit followed this approach in an unpublished decision. In United States v. Ohiri, the court looked to McCann and
concluded that “the Supreme Court [in Ruiz] did not imply that the government may avoid the consequence of a Brady violation if the defendant accepts
an eleventh-hour plea agreement while ignorant of withheld exculpatory evidence in the government’s possession.” 133 F. App’x 555, 562 (10th Cir. 2005).
Ohiri noted two important factors that distinguish Ruiz from other plea
agreements. First, the Ruiz plea was a fast-track, federal plea prior to indictment in contract to Ohiri’s “eleventh-hour plea” on the day of jury selection; and
second, like the McCann court, the Tenth Circuit found an important difference
between the impeachment evidence in Ruiz and exculpatory evidence. Id.
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Some federal district and state courts have also continued
to follow their pre-Ruiz Brady holdings in favor of requiring
disclosure of exculpatory evidence prior to plea bargains. The
Northern District of Oklahoma, for example, recently required
the prosecution to produce exculpatory evidence following a
motion to vacate a conviction from a guilty plea, citing a Brady
247
duty to disclose. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals similarly
found “the thrust of the Supreme Court’s holding in Ruiz to be
rooted in its desire to preserve the federal ‘fast track’ plea bargain process,” and has applied Brady rights where a defendant
“made both a Brady demand and a statutory demand for excul248
patory evidence” before pleading guilty.
The Fifth Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion, determining that “Ruiz never makes such a distinction” between
types of pretrial evidence and that a distinction between impeachment and exculpatory evidence cannot be “implied from
249
its discussion.” This is not surprising, given that prior to Ruiz
the circuit identified no pretrial Brady rights, finding that because Brady protects against “potential effects of undisclosed
information on a judge’s or jury’s assessment of guilt . . . the
failure of a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory information to an
individual waiving his right to trial is not a constitutional vio250
lation.” The Second Circuit agrees, for the most part with the
Fifth Circuit, finding no distinction between impeachment and
exculpatory evidence, and hinting that Ruiz’s limitation of pretrial Brady rights extends to exculpatory materials. It recently
noted that “the Supreme Court has consistently treated exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the same way for the purpose of defining the obligation of a prosecutor to provide Brady
251
material prior to trial,” and that Ruiz might preclude any

247. United States v. Crawford, No. 07-CR-41-GKF, 2010 WL 5071039, at
*4 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 7, 2010) (“[T]he Court nonetheless reminds the Government of its duty under Brady to provide Crawford with any and all exculpatory evidence.”).
248. State v. Harris, 667 N.W.2d 813, 821 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003), aff ’d 680
N.W.2d 737 (Wis. 2004); see also State v. Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d 589, 590 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1999) (reversing the circuit court’s denial of a request to withdraw a
guilty plea “[ b]ecause the State failed to provide Sturgeon with exculpatory
evidence related to his confession to the policy and because such failure caused
Sturgeon to plead guilty”).
249. United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009).
250. Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 361–62 (5th Cir. 2000).
251. Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d Cir. 2010).
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Brady right to exculpatory evidence prior to a guilty plea. Finally, it appears that the Fourth Circuit will take the Fifth and
Second Circuit’s route. It has hinted that Ruiz extends to exculpatory evidence, referring to its holding just after Ruiz that
a prosecutor’s withholding “potentially relevant mitigation evidence” prior to a plea does not merit invalidation of a guilty
253
plea.
254
Even if Brady does not apply pretrial, some courts have
suggested that a defendant may nonetheless be able to challenge the voluntariness of a plea due to a failure to disclose evidence. The First Circuit, for example, has noted in addressing
alleged misconduct during plea bargaining that “[u]nder limited circumstances . . . the prosecution’s failure to disclose evidence may be sufficiently outrageous to constitute the sort of
impermissible conduct that is needed to ground a challenge to
255
the validity of a guilty plea” —regardless of the Brady stand256
ard. The Fifth Circuit has employed similar reasoning.
Ultimately, Ruiz and subsequent opinions do not provide a
clear answer as to the scope of pretrial rights to disclosure evidence. Indeed, Ruiz’s lack of clarity on this point may have
helped it attract eight votes. While its focus on the usefulness
of the information to the defendant and its identification of the
government’s interest in securing a “factually justified” guilty
plea suggest a disclosure requirement with respect to exculpa-

252. Id. (finding that “the reasoning underlying Ruiz could support a similar ruling [regarding exculpatory evidence] for a prosecutor’s obligations prior
to a guilty plea”). This represents a change in position for the Second Circuit,
which formerly recognized pretrial Brady rights to exculpatory material. See,
e.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The government’s obligation [under Brady] is pertinent not only to an accused’s preparation for trial but also to his determination of whether or not to plead guilty.”).
253. United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing
Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 315 n.5 (4th Cir. 2002)).
254. For an argument that Brady rights are, in any case, of little value to
defendants who plead guilty, see John C. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 445 (2001)
(explaining that Brady may be of little use to in challenges to plea agreements
and noting that “defendants who enter pleas to especially favorable deals may
be those who receive the least protection in post-plea Brady challenges” because the prosecution’s offer, not the evidence, had the most impact on the
plea, yet these are the defendants most at risk of being coerced into a deal).
255. Ferrera v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 291 (1st Cir. 2006).
256. See Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 364 n.15 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that “[e]ven if the nondisclosure is not a Brady violation,” failure to disclose evidence pretrial may sometimes make it “impossible for [a defendant] to
enter a knowing and intelligent plea”).
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tory evidence, its broader reasoning on the validity of guilty
pleas despite defendants’ ignorance of important facts and its
257
holding on information supporting any affirmative defense
258
cuts the other way. This uncertainty will make Brady claims
by state prisoners particularly difficult on federal habeas review because a federal habeas petitioner bringing an exhausted
state claim is often required to show that the state court decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly
259
established federal law. It will also make it more likely that
some defendants will sign DNA waivers without knowing what
evidence exists.
C. WAIVERS APPLIED
As established above, any court reviewing a defendant’s
challenge to a plea bargain with a DNA waiver will begin by
260
presuming validity. Depending on a defendant’s challenge to
the waiver, however, the court must also ask whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to DNA
testing, whether (perhaps) the waiver is a miscarriage of justice, or whether the plea as a whole—as a result of Strickland
or Brady—may be withdrawn. Building on the discussion
above, but not addressing the possibility of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Section explores the likelihood that a
court would enforce a DNA waiver in a range of possible factual
261
scenarios. In each scenario, three factors are considered: first,
257. See, e.g., Rehal, 618 F.3d at 154 & n.5 (noting that Ruiz’s rejection of
“the argument that the Constitution requires the pre-plea disclosure of information supporting any affirmative defense” supports the conclusion that prosecutors do not have an obligation to provide Brady material prior to a guilty
plea).
258. Even if there is a pretrial Brady right, some courts have taken the position that untested DNA evidence does not meet the materiality standard. See
infra notes 277–78 and accompanying text.
259. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (“An application for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . . .”).
260. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
261. It is worth emphasizing again that a defendant may have no remedy
for destruction of DNA evidence pursuant to an apparently valid waiver later
deemed unenforceable. Cf. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)
(“[U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police,
failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of
due process of law.”).
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the prosecutor’s and defendant’s knowledge of the evidence and
testing technologies; second, whether DNA testing has already
been done; and third, the degree of detail in the description of
the evidence in the waiver itself.
1. Complete Defendant and Prosecutor Knowledge of
Evidence, Thorough Testing, and a Specific Description of
Present and Possible Future Evidence in the Waiver
In the first hypothetical bargaining scenario, a prosecutor
or the police (the distinction is largely irrelevant as a result of
262
Kyles v. Whitley) have all of the evidence from the crime
scene and have thoroughly tested it. It is unlikely, based on
what both sides know, that further evidence will appear or become testable by improved technology in the foreseeable future.
Both the prosecution and the defendant are aware of all of the
evidence from the scene and the testing results, and the results
are clearly inculpatory. Both the nonbiological and DNA evidence point strongly to the defendant’s guilt, and both the defendant and the prosecutor know this. The language of the
DNA waiver itself also refers directly to the items of evidence
identified, tested, and known to both parties. Further, the DNA
waiver makes clear that if future evidence or testing were to be
available, the defendant would have no rights to it. No waivers
identified for this Article satisfy all of these criteria, but one
waiver in the Southern District of Illinois comes close to meeting this standard. The waiver identifies “physical evidence in
this case which may have biological evidence, such as semen,
blood, saliva, hair, skin, tissue, or other identifiable biological
material, that could be subjected to DNA testing either now or
263
in the future.”
In this scenario, the defendant is aware and has knowledge
of the evidence and has likely carefully thought through its implications for his case. He knows that identification of further
evidence is unlikely and that even if further evidence were unearthed, if would not do much good. All that the criminal defendant will therefore give up in a DNA waiver is the right to
further, independent testing of DNA evidence that has already
262. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (holding that because
the prosecutor is responsible for determining when the “net effect” requires
disclosure of evidence, the “prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to . . . the police”).
263. Plea Agreement § 7, United States v. McPike, Criminal No. 05-30069WDS (S.D. Ill., May 6, 2005).
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been tested thoroughly by the state, and the defendant will
likely take the deal. A court, in turn, will have few, if any, reasons to question the knowing and voluntary nature of the waiver; nor is there any miscarriage of justice. Finally, there is no
Brady violation because no exculpatory evidence has been
withheld. In this scenario, a DNA waiver is almost certain to be
enforced.
2. Complete Prosecutor and Defendant Knowledge of
Evidence, No Testing, and Specific Description of Evidence in
the Waiver
The second hypothetical DNA waiver scenario is identical
to the first, with the exception of testing. The prosecutor has
collected all of the evidence from the crime scene. It is unlikely
that more evidence will emerge, but the prosecutor has identified and revealed to the defendant specific items that could potentially be available or subject to better testing in the future,
if any are known. Both the prosecutor and defendant are fully
aware of the evidence and its nature, and the DNA waiver specifically describes the evidence as well as specific possible future pieces of evidence and future available testing. Again, the
language of the waiver makes clear that the defendant is giving
up the right both to have access to and test specific existing evidence and potential future evidence. In this scenario, however,
the prosecutor has not tested the available DNA evidence. This
scenario is similar to the facts reflected in a federal plea bargain in the Southern District of California, with a waiver that
reads as follows:
Defendant has been advised that the government may have in its
possession items of physical evidence that could be subjected to DNA
testing. The defendant understands that the government does not intend to conduct DNA testing of any of these items. Defendant understands that, before entering guilty pleas pursuant to this Plea
Agreement, he could request DNA testing of evidence in this case.
The defendant further understands that, with respect to the offenses
to which he is pleading guilty pursuant to this Plea Agreement, he
would have the right to request DNA testing of evidence after conviction under the conditions specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3600. Knowing and
understanding his right to request DNA testing, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily gives up that right with respect to both the specific items listed above and any other items of evidence there may be
in this case that might be amenable to DNA testing. . . . The defendant further understands and acknowledges that by giving up this
right, he will never have another opportunity to have the evidence in
this case, whether or not listed above, submitted for DNA testing, or
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to employ the results of DNA testing to support a claim that defend264
ant is innocent of the offenses to which he is pleading guilty.

The Supreme Court has held that when a prosecutor has
evidence but has not tested it or otherwise determined its exculpatory or inculpatory nature, the prosecutor’s failure to test
265
does not, in itself, violate the Constitution. Further, the failure to test likely does not prevent the defendant’s plea from being voluntary. First, the defendant has been specifically informed that the government “does not intend” to conduct the
testing but that, absent the waiver, the defendant could request
it. This situation is roughly analogous to cases prior to the 1999
Rule 11 amendments where defendants who knew generally
about their rights to appeal but not about all specific potential
appeals were found to have entered an appeal waiver knowing266
ly and voluntarily. Defendants need not know all possible options. Nor is there a Brady problem, as the prosecutor has disclosed the evidence. Assuming that there is adequate proof that
the defendant understood the waiver, it is very likely to be enforced. If a court recognizes a miscarriage of justice exception,
however, it may find one here if the defendant is able to raise
serious doubts about his guilt.
3. No Prosecutor or Defendant Knowledge of Evidence, no
Testing, General Description of Evidence in the Waiver
In a third, less happy scenario, neither the prosecutor nor
the defendant possesses biological evidence from the crime
scene at the time of the plea; alternately, both parties have access to evidence, but it is not currently testable. In either case,
the prosecutor has not tested the evidence and therefore does
not know whether it is inculpatory, exculpatory, or indeterminate. Due to the lack of currently testable evidence, the waiver
does not refer to specific items, but is as specific as the facts allow: it warns the defendant that he is giving up a right to test
any evidence that may be available in the future, or current evidence that is untestable now but may be testable in the future.
264. Plea Agreement at 11–12, United States v. Ortega, No. 2:09-CR-00517
GEB (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2010) (on file with author).
265. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59 (1988) (holding that “the police do not
have a constitutional duty to perform any particular tests”); cf. infra note 278
and accompanying text (arguing that untested but potentially exculpatory material must be disclosed under Brady).
266. See United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that the defendant’s appeal waiver was made knowingly, even
though he may not have known the exact nature of the appeals he had given up).
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Most DNA waivers do not appear to be this explicit with respect to future testing, but some are—providing, for example,
that “the physical evidence in this case will . . . be unavailable
267
for DNA testing in the future.”
As in the previous two scenarios, this DNA waiver is likely
valid. The defendant here has sufficient knowledge of various
potential outcomes of the case and can likely make a reasonable assessment of his chances under the circumstances. The
fact that the evidence itself or certain testing techniques are
not currently available will not change the outcome. If defendants can knowingly and voluntarily waive their rights while
operating under a misapprehension of “the quality of the
268
State’s case,” then they can certainly waive rights when both
the prosecutor and defendant face unknowable facts. And if an
advanced testing technology later emerges that casts doubt on
the defendant’s guilt, “a plea’s validity may not be collaterally
attacked merely because the defendant made what turned out,
269
in retrospect, to be a poor deal.” If, on the other hand, the
waiver is vague with respect to evidence not currently in the
government’s possession, a court may not enforce it with re270
spect to newly discovered evidence.
As in scenario two, there is also no Brady violation here, as
no evidence has been suppressed. If the defendant is able to
produce testable evidence, however, a miscarriage of justice
standard is stronger because of the apparent unfairness of a
bar on testing newly available evidence.

267. Plea Agreement at 7, United States v. Natera, No. 3:09-CR-221 JBH
HBF (C.D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2010); see also, e.g., Plea Agreement at 5, United
States v. Almanza, No. 1:09-CR-430 (E.D. Va. Dec. 17, 2009) (on file with author) (“[T]he waiver forecloses any opportunity to have evidence submitted for
DNA testing in this case or in any post-conviction proceeding for any
purpose . . . .”).
268. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970) (finding “no requirement in the Constitution that a defendant must be permitted to disown his
solemn admission in open court that he committed the act with which he is
charged simply because it later develops that the State would have had a
weaker case than the defendant had thought”).
269. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 186 (2005).
270. See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 7, United States v. White, No. 1:07-CR314 -RCL (D.D.C. May 1, 2008) (on file with author) ( providing that defendant
“waives any and all right . . . to require DNA testing of any physical evidence
in the possession of the Government”).

1000

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:952

4. Concealed Prosecutor Knowledge of Evidence, Evidence Not
Tested, No Specific Description of Evidence in the Waiver
Moving toward more legally tenuous ground, in the fourth
factual DNA waiver hypothetical, the facts are similar to scenario two above. There is specific evidence in the case, and the
prosecutor has knowledge of the evidence but has not tested it.
In this scenario, though, the prosecution embarks upon two
questionable courses of action. First, she does not tell the defendant that the evidence exists, and second, she does not specifically refer to the evidence in the DNA waiver. Instead, she
simply states that the defendant waives “any evidence that the
prosecution might have.” One waiver in the Eastern District of
Virginia—in a case in which, presumably, no evidence was concealed—used this type of ambiguous language, stating, “The
defendant . . . understands that this waiver applies to DNA
testing of any items of evidence in this case that could be sub271
jected to DNA testing . . . .” This language, unlike previous
waiver examples, does not necessarily make clear that there is
any biological evidence in the case (although it should give
competent counsel reason to wonder) and also does not make
clear whether any of the evidence could or has been subjected
to DNA testing.
Although the failure to test will not make the DNA waiver
unknowing or involuntary—since the prosecutor him or herself
does not know how valuable the DNA may be—the failure to
specifically describe the evidence in the plea bargain may inval272
Even
idate the DNA waiver by rendering it unknowing.
though courts have found that general descriptions of rights
can make a waiver of those rights sufficiently knowing and vol273
274
untary, the right to DNA testing is quite specific. In contrast to the appeal waiver scenario, in which a defendant generally apprised of appeal rights will have enough information to
know, in general, what he is giving up, a defendant who is entirely unaware of the existence of potentially testable DNA evidence will arguably not know that he is actually giving up any271. Plea Agreement § 6, at 5, United States v. Jin, Criminal No. 09-CR249 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2009).
272. Cf. Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 364 n.15 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting
that “[e]ven if the nondisclosure is not a Brady violation,” failure to disclose
evidence pretrial may sometimes make it “impossible for [a defendant] to enter
a knowing and intelligent plea”).
273. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 207.
274. See supra Part II.B.1.
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thing—let alone the specifics of that right. Despite the appeal
of this argument, however, it is very similar to the one rejected
in Ruiz, in which the Court emphasized that “the law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently
aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the
right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances—even though the defendant may not know the specific
275
detailed consequences of invoking it.”
There may be a Brady violation, however, assuming any
276
such right exists prior to the entry of a guilty plea. The prosecutor has evidence, but she has not told the defendant about
the evidence or tested it to determine whether it is exculpatory;
she is also requesting in the waiver that the evidence be destroyed. Because the prosecution has not tested the evidence,
and therefore does not know whether or not it is exculpatory,
some courts considering similar scenarios have held that the
277
evidence is not material under Brady. As has been persuasively argued, however, “[s]uggestions that DNA need not be
tested because ‘it is not now known whether the biological evidence being sought by [the defendant] would be favorable or
unfavorable to him’ and could have been denied at trial mis-

275. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
276. See supra Part II.B.3.a (discussing Brady challenges to waivers of
DNA testing).
277. See, e.g., Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 385 (4th Cir. 2002) (King, J.,
concurring) (“Harvey’s denial of access to the [untested] biological evidence
after his conviction and sentencing, standing alone, fails to contravene
Brady.”); Richard v. Girdich, No. 9:03-CV-920, 2009 WL 2045685, at *12
(N.D.N.Y. July 10, 2009) (“Since the biological evidence that forms the basis of
these habeas claims was not subjected to forensic testing—and was, therefore,
not necessarily exculpatory—Petitioner is not entitled to habeas intervention
on his claims that the District Attorney did not preserve such potentially exculpatory evidence. . . . Furthermore, because the forensic evidence about
which Petitioner now complains was not subject to DNA testing, his claims
that the prosecutor necessarily suppressed exculpatory evidence . . . is necessarily rooted in speculation.”); Nelson v. Blades, No. CV 04 -001-S-LMB, 2009
WL 790172, at *11 (D. Idaho Mar. 23, 2009) (“[Petitioner] does not have a valid claim under [Brady] because there is no indication that any non-disclosed
item actually held exculpatory value to him. More to the point, Petitioner does
not have any evidence that the towels did not contain an oily substance or his
genetic material, or that the testing of any other items would have been favorable to him. The most that can be said is that some items might have been potentially useful.”); Roughley v. Dretke, No. 3:04 -CV-1667-N, 2004 WL
2468520, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2004) (“It also is conceded that DNA testing
was not performed on any tangible evidence prior to his criminal trial, thus
there was no ‘Brady’ material which could have been withheld.”).
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read Supreme Court precedent and exalt willful ignorance.”
Nonetheless, as John Douglass has observed: “Volumes of
Brady opinions demonstrate that reviewing courts are reluctant to find nondisclosures ‘material’ when it means upsetting a
jury verdict. It is not hard to imagine, then, how skeptical judges will be when a defendant demands to take back his own
279
open-court confession of guilt.”
Even if a defendant is unable to make a successful Brady
claim here, a court, following reasoning similar to that em280
ployed by the First and Fifth Circuits, might still find the
281
failure to disclose the evidence to be “outrageous” and refuse
to affirm the plea. And if the court recognizes a miscarriage of
282
justice exception, this scenario would be a strong candidate.

278. Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 50, at 587 (footnote omitted).
279. Douglass, supra note 254, at 478.
280. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text.
281. Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 291 (1st Cir. 2006); Matthew
v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 364 n.15 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Even if the nondisclosure
is not a Brady violation, it may be argued . . . that it made it impossible for
[the defendant] to enter a knowing and intelligent plea.”); see also text accompanying notes 255–256.
282. See supra Part II.B.2. Also note that a prosecutor who deliberately
conceals untested DNA evidence prior to a plea bargain has likely violated the
ABA’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d), which, in concert with a subsequent ABA Formal Opinion, appears to require timely disclosure of evidence
prior to guilty pleas. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2010); ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 9-454, (2009) ( providing
that “prior to a guilty plea, to enable the defendant to make a well-advised
plea at the time of arraignment, a prosecutor must disclose known evidence
and information that would be relevant or useful to establishing a defense or
negating the prosecution’s proof ”). Indeed, at least one state supreme court
has suspended a prosecutor for failing to disclose potentially useful DNA evidence prior to a guilty plea, citing rules of professional responsibility and not
Brady. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Wrenn, 790 N.E.2d 1195, 1196–97
(Ohio 2003) (“[The] Office of Disciplinary Counsel, charged [the prosecutor]
with misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.”). But
even that court subsequently held that the ethical duty of disclosure was no
greater than the constitutional and duty, raising, once again the Brady question. Disciplinary Council v. Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d 125, 130 (Ohio 2010)
(“We decline to construe [the ethics rules] as requiring a grater scope of disclosure than Brady . . . .”); see also Kevin C. McMunigal, The (Lack of ) Enforcement of Prosecutor Disclosure Rules, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 847, 860–62 (2010)
(discussing Kellogg-Martin as an example of the reluctance of courts to enforce
disclosure rules). Beyond that, “disciplinary authorities rarely proceed against
prosecutors in cases that raise interpretive questions under Rule 3.8(d),” ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, supra, and there may be sufficient
doubt as to the materiality of untested evidence to allow prosecutors to generally escape sanction.
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5. Concealed Prosecutor Knowledge of Evidence, Evidence
Tested and Exculpatory, No Specific Description of Evidence in
Waiver
In the final scenario, in which the arguments are strongest
for invalidity, the facts are identical to scenario four, but now
the prosecutor has the evidence, has tested it and knows that it
is exculpatory, and has still not revealed the evidence to the defendant. Nor has the prosecutor specifically referred to the existence of the specific evidence in the waiver. Rather, she has
once again used general language in the waiver, stating that
the defendant “waives any evidence that the prosecution might
have.” In this case, the argument that the waiver is unknowing
and involuntary is similar to that in scenario four, albeit per283
haps more compelling due to the obvious unfairness at work.
This factual scenario would also present a true test of
284
whether Brady rights extend to the pretrial context. Any
court that has interpreted Ruiz to leave room for a pretrial
Brady right to exculpatory evidence would likely find that the
prosecution’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence violated
285
the defendant’s constitutional right. Assuming the evidence is
conclusive, the defendant could also likely show a “‘reasonable
probability that but for the failure to produce such information
the defendant would not have entered the plea but instead
286
would have insisted on going to trial.’”
As in scenario four, even if a defendant is unable to make a
successful Brady claim here, some courts might still find the
failure to disclose the evidence to be sufficiently shocking to
287
render the plea involuntary. And, again, if the jurisdiction
283. In scenario four, the prosecutor concealed knowledge of the evidence,
but did not test it. Here, the prosecutor has tested the evidence and knows it is
exculpatory.
284. See supra Part II.B.3.a (discussing Brady challenges to waivers of
DNA testing and discussing how some courts have recognized Brady rights
prior to a guilty plea).
285. See McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787–88 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“Ruiz strongly suggest that a Brady-type disclosure might be required under
the circumstances . . . . Ruiz indicates a significant distinction between impeachment information and exculpatory evidence of actual innocence.”); supra
Part II.B.3.a (discussing Ruiz and its interpretation in the circuit courts).
286. United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 256 (2d. Cir. 1998) (quoting
Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20, 24 (2d. Cir. 1992)); see also Hashimoto, supra note
40, at 955 n.33 (discussing the Brady materiality standard as applied to plea
bargains).
287. See supra Part II.C.4 (discussing the “outrageous” standard as applied
to a similar fact pattern).
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recognizes a miscarriage of justice exception, this scenario
288
would be extremely likely to qualify.
In sum, DNA waivers are likely to survive challenges in a
variety of factual scenarios—including, depending on the jurisdiction, some that are fairly disturbing. Up to this point, this
Article has provided a descriptive account of DNA waivers. It
has identified their relatively common use at the federal level
through 2010, has suggested that they may expand to the
states if they have not already, and has explored their validity
in anticipation of likely challenges to DNA waivers in courts.
The following Part presents a normative account of DNA waivers, considering arguments both for and against their use and
suggesting that on balance, prosecutors’ use of waivers is problematic in most circumstances.
III. DNA TESTING WAIVERS AS POLICY
Although no court has directly addressed the issue, as discussed in Part II, DNA waivers are likely to be enforceable un289
der at least some circumstances. The question remains, however, when, if ever, are they desirable. As the Department of
290
Justice has already done in at least two circumstances, the
federal government can encourage or discourage the use of
DNA waivers for policy reasons, as can state prosecutors’ offices. This Part explores the arguments both for and against DNA
waivers.
A. AGAINST WAIVERS
DNA waivers destroy biological evidence or, at minimum,
preclude defendants from accessing this evidence following
291
their plea bargain. This leads, or could lead, to several undesirable results for defendants and society as a whole. Because
there is reason to believe that some innocent defendants will
both plead guilty and agree to a DNA waiver, DNA waivers will
likely keep some innocent defendants in prison. In doing so,
waivers may cover up prosecutorial misconduct. Even in the
288. See supra Part II.C.4 (arguing that the miscarriage of justice standard
could apply to a similar fact pattern).
289. See supra notes 174–79 and accompanying text (discussing the validity of DNA waivers).
290. See supra notes 29, 31 and accompanying text (discussing Department
of Justice memoranda on the use of DNA waivers).
291. See supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text (giving examples of plea
agreements).
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absence of prosecutorial wrongdoing, the public’s interest in
uncovering wrongful convictions—both to apprehend the true
criminals and to isolate flaws in the system—is thwarted.
Moreover, DNA waivers undermine confidence in the criminal
justice system as a whole: the use of waivers suggests to the
public that subjecting conviction to the most powerful test of
truth available is a thing to be avoided. And by turning the
right to DNA testing into yet another bargaining chip, DNA
waivers weaken the societal commitment to innocence—a
292
commitment embodied in fifty DNA testing statutes.
1. Preventing Relief for the Wrongfully Convicted
As introduced in Part I, it is well-established that some innocent defendants plead guilty. Of the 266 wrongfully convicted
defendants who had been exonerated by DNA as of February
293
2011, twenty-two pleaded guilty, and even more made false
294
admissions. It is likely that the same motivations that drive
people to falsely profess their guilt will often also drive them to
sign away their right to prove their innocence.
A criminal defendant considering a guilty plea calculates,
to the best of his knowledge, the likelihood of conviction, the
likelihood of receiving a less desirable sentence outside of the
bargaining process, and the importance of the trial process to
295
When making the valuethe defendant, for example.
probability consideration, however, the defendant often has
very limited information to work with, and “[i]nnocent defendants often have less information about the case against them
296
than guilty defendants.” Where a defendant was not at the
crime scene, for example, he may not know whether there were
297
eyewitnesses. Other defendants who may have been near or
at the crime scene with other people may not themselves know
292. See supra note 14 ( providing examples of state DNA testing statutes).
293. When the Innocent Plead Guilty, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/When_the_Innocent_Plead_Guilty.php#
( last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
294. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 13, at 444 –49 (analyzing the likelihood
that defendants in sixty different cases made false confessions).
295. See Allison D. Redlich, The Susceptibility of Juveniles to False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 943, 945 (2010) (“[Defendants’] decision is presumably based on numerous factors, including their understanding of the law, the probability of conviction at trial, the value of the
plea offer . . . advice and perceived effectiveness of attorneys, perceptions of
procedural justice, etc.”).
296. Hashimoto, supra note 40, at 951.
297. Id.
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“whether they committed the offense,” for example—if they
298
were intoxicated, or mentally ill or handicapped. And beyond
informational limitations, the literature has begun to document
other factors that may influence the decision to plead guilty, including factors such as “race, ethnicity, [and] gender,” as well
299
as age; pressure from family members; and, more generally,
an overwhelming sense of “despair” when faced with the power
300
of the State. Innocent defendants may also be more risk
averse, in which case “[p]rosecutorial bluffing is likely to work
301
particularly well” against them. Finally, innocent defendants,
especially those who are indigent, may be pushed to take a plea
by their lawyers: “defense attorneys have powerful incentives
to avoid trial, even when a trial would be in the client’s inter302
est.” In sum, there are sound reasons to believe that the plea
303
bargaining system induces innocent people to plead guilty,
and the available evidence supports this belief.
Very likely, the same factors that drive innocent defendants to plead guilty will drive some of them to agree to a DNA
waiver. Compared to pleading guilty, a DNA waiver may be a
304
small concession, if it is deliberated over at all. This is especially likely to be true if the defendant is not aware of any evidence to be tested. And for those innocent defendants who sign
298. Id.
299. Redlich, supra note 295.
300. Barkai, supra note 40, at 96–97.
301. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2495 (2004); see also F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma
Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 199 (2002)
(explaining that for innocent defendants, “[t]he prosecutor will offer increasingly enticing bargains to the defendant because the evidence does not bear
out [the charges]” and “[e]ventually there may come a point where, even for
the innocent, accepting the prosecutor’s offer may seem more attractive than
the risk of trial”).
302. Schulhofer, supra note 13, at 1988: see also Eunyung Theresa Oh,
Note, Innocence After “Guilt”: Postconviction DNA Relief for Innocents Who
Pled Guilty, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 161, 167–68 (2004) (explaining that indigent
defendants’ attorneys often encourage guilty pleas and, when they meet their
client for the first time, “bring a negotiated plea with them”).
303. See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 3, 12–19 (1978) (discussing the parallels between medieval torture and
the modern plea bargaining system, and characterizing the modern American
system as one in which the state “coerce[s] the accused against whom we find
probable cause to confess [their] guilt”).
304. On the other hand, as discussed below, prosecutorial insistence on a
DNA waiver may push some innocent defendants to demand trial. See infra
Part III.B.2.
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them, DNA waivers will significantly limit their ability to ac305
cess exculpatory evidence.
Where DNA waivers do prevent the wrongfully convicted
from establishing their innocence, moreover, it is not only the
306
defendant who suffers, but the public as well. Exonerations
307
frequently lead to the apprehension of the actual perpetrator,
and the public has a strong interest in ensuring that innocent
308
defendants are not wrongfully imprisoned. Where an innocent defendant is able to prove a wrongful conviction on appeal
or through habeas, each court decision reversing a conviction
also adds to the body of the literature describing the flaws that
309
led to the wrongful conviction. Although most court decisions
do not describe these flaws in detail, innocence commissions often investigate the cases after-the-fact to identify causal factors
such as false confessions, erroneous eyewitness testimony, and
310
flawed forensic techniques. Reducing the number of exonerations, then, reduces the available data on which to base re311
form.
2. Increasing the Likelihood of Wrongful Convictions by
Concealing Wrongdoing, Eliminating Review, and Eroding the
Commitment to Innocence
DNA waivers will increase the likelihood of wrongful convictions at the plea bargaining stage in several ways. First, and
most obviously, DNA waivers have the potential to conceal po305. See supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text ( providing examples of
DNA waivers and discussing their effect on access to and preservation of
evidence).
306. See Wiseman, supra note 10, at 702–08 (discussing the benefits of exonerations for families, victims, and communities).
307. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_
Exonerations.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (“The true suspects and/or perpetrators have been identified in 124 of the DNA exoneration cases.”); see also
Wiseman, supra note 10, at 695–702 (describing several identifications of real
perpetrators following DNA exonerations).
308. See Wiseman, supra note 10, at 705 (discussing the benefits of posthumous exonerations, including that they are “important to the community
and its sense of fairness and justice”).
309. Id. at 702 (“[P]osthumous exonerations can serve a valuable role in
the effort to prevent wrongful convictions by producing instructive findings on
their causes . . . .”).
310. See Wiseman, supra note 10, at 726–35 (describing the role and practices of innocence commissions).
311. See id. at 717–18 (“Without posthumous exoneration, the lessons that
could be gleaned from their misfortunes die with them.”).
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lice and prosecutorial misconduct, including the failure to turn
over exculpatory DNA evidence, whether deliberate or through
312
negligence. This is particularly true for those waivers that allow for the immediate destruction of evidence and those that
apply to evidence which the defendant is unaware of and which
may not have been available or testable at the time of the plea.
For example, many of the DNA waivers used by federal prosecutors cause the defendant to waive “any opportunity to have
evidence submitted for DNA testing in this case or in any post313
conviction proceeding for any purpose.” Others waive “any
and all right” to “require DNA testing of any physical evidence
in the possession of the Government” and to the preservation of
314
“any physical evidence in this case.” Literally applied, such a
waiver would bar testing whether the defendant knew that
there was testable material or not when he signed. This is especially troubling in light of the uncertainty over the existence
315
of a pretrial right to exculpatory evidence.
More subtly, DNA waivers may also lead to reduced accuracy in plea bargaining by reducing prosecutors’ incentives for
convicting only the guilty. Waivers of DNA testing, like appeal
and habeas waivers, protect prosecutors from review. As one
attorney has described appeal waivers, they “have the advantage of putting an end to it. It’s peace of mind, nice to know
you’re not going to end up in two years arguing” a collateral
316
challenge. This protection may be especially valuable to prosecutors because being proven to have convicted an innocent defendant has negative professional, and perhaps psychological,

312. Cf. King & O’Neill, supra note 72, at 247 (“[O]ne concern with full
blanket [appeal] waivers is that attorneys will not be as careful as they should
be if they know their past and future mistakes are protected from scrutiny.”).
313. E.g., Plea Agreement § 6, at 5, United States v. Almanza, No.
l:09cr430 (E.D. Va. Dec. 17, 2009); Plea Agreement § 6, at 5, United States v.
Gomez, No. l:07cr125 (E.D. Va. Apr. 20, 2007).
314. Plea Agreement § 21, at 31, United States v. Headley, No. 09 CR 8303 (N.D. Ill.) (using identical language); Letter from Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney, Dep’t. of Justice, to Jerry Ray Smith, Esquire 6 (Jan. 19, 2007) (using
identical language); see also Plea Agreement § III.7.A., at 11, United States v.
McPike, Criminal No. 05-30069-WDS (S.D. Ill. May 6, 2005) (defendant cedes
all right to testing of “physical evidence in this case which may have biological
evidence, such as semen, blood, saliva, hair, skin tissue, or other identifiable
biological material, that could be subjected to DNA testing either now or in the
future”).
315. See supra notes 232–42 and accompanying text.
316. King & O’Neill, supra note 72, at 245–46 (quoting telephone interview
with Defender #21).
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317

consequences for a prosecutor. Indeed, this may help explain
why
prosecutors
will
sometimes
vigorously
oppose
postconviction DNA testing when it would be highly probative
and even continue to assert the defendant’s guilt after exculpa318
tory results. These consequences give prosecutors an additional incentive to be sure of the defendant’s guilt before prosecuting. If the prosecutor is able to routinely obtain DNA
319
waivers, this incentive disappears, and the rate of wrongful
320
convictions may rise.
Finally, DNA waivers may also increase the likelihood of
wrongful convictions by eroding the burgeoning commitment to
treating the right to establish innocence, at least by conclusive
DNA evidence, as qualitatively different. This commitment is
321
expressed in state and federal testing statutes, as well as re322
cent changes to the rules of professional conduct and the Supreme Court’s apparent, grudging acceptance of the existence
323
of a habeas claim founded on actual innocence. As many have
317. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to PostConviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 138 (2004) (describing
the psychological and personal factors that affect prosecutors’ views of postconviction innocence claims).
318. See id. at 129 (“Likewise, qualitative evidence of prosecutorial indifference and, on occasion, hostility to even the most meritorious of postconviction innocence claims is alarming.”).
319. A refusal to sign a waiver, though, may, to some extent, help innocent
defendants signal their innocence at the pretrial stage. See infra notes 345–47
and accompanying text.
320. This very concern has led a few courts to prohibit appeal waivers,
holding, for example, that “public policy forbids the prosecutor from insulating
himself from review by either implicitly or explicitly bargaining away a defendant’s right to appeal.” People v. Stevenson, 231 N.W.2d 476, 477 ( Mich.
Ct. App. 1975); see also United States v. Perez, 46 F. Supp. 2d 59, 61 (D. Mass.
1999) (“[T]he market for plea bargains, like every other market, should not be
so deregulated that the conditions essential to assuring basic fairness are
undermined.”).
321. See supra note 14 (describing the fifty state, federal, and District of
Columbia statutes).
322. See supra note 15 (discussing the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct R. 3.8(g), (h)).
323. See, e.g., In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (mem.) (transferring Troy
Davis’s petition for an original writ of habeas corpus to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia for “hearing and determination” and directing that court to “receive testimony and make findings of fact
as to whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial
clearly establishes petitioner’s innocence”); Dist. Atty’s Office v. Osborne, 129
S. Ct. 2308, 2321–22 (2009) (noting that it is an “open question” whether a
“federal constitutional right to be released upon proof of ‘actual innocence’” exists); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536–38, 555 (2006) (assuming arguendo that
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noted, although the law allows, and even requires, the continued imprisonment of those whose convictions were obtained in
324
violation of the Constitution, there is a general consensus
that when convincing evidence of innocence exists, convictions
325
should be overturned. While this focus on factual innocence
may do little directly for the majority of defendants who are ac326
cused of crimes for which no biological evidence is available,
indirectly, it reinforces the ideal of punishing only the guilty—
and all innocent defendants benefit from widespread commitment to this ideal. The use of DNA waivers, however, is inconsistent with this ideal. Commodifying the right to prove inno327
cence through DNA waivers risks the loss of its sanctity. Like
the right to impeachment evidence, to trial, or to an appeal, it
becomes just another bargaining chip.
3. Reducing Public Confidence
Convicting innocent defendants—although perhaps not entirely unavoidable—is deeply morally troublesome; so is leaving
them in prison when proof of their innocence might be, or could
have been, available. Even if DNA waivers never prevent a single exoneration or lead to even one wrongful conviction, howev328
er, they still may impose significant social costs. As has been
freestanding innocence claims are possible, and holding that they require at
least “more convincing proof of innocence” than a showing that it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt had the new evidence been available at trial); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (“We may assume . . . that in a capital
case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial
would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief . . . .”); see also In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL
3385081, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010) (concluding that “while executing an
innocent person would violate the United States Constitution, Mr. Davis has
failed to prove his innocence”). The Supreme Court denied Mr. Davis’s petition
for habeas corpus. In re Davis, 131 S. Ct. 1808 (2011) (mem.).
324. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (allowing federal courts to grant
habeas relief from state convictions in only very limited circumstances).
325. See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 317, at 127 (“Frequently . . . the public
rhetoric and personal beliefs expressed by prosecutors condemn the idea that
any district attorney would willingly permit an innocent person to languish in
prison.”).
326. See Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1571–
72 (“[O]nly an estimated 10 to 20 percent of criminal cases have biological evidence available for testing . . . .”).
327. See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43
DUKE L.J. 56, 57–62 (1993) (contrasting “commodified” forms of compensation
for wrongdoing with “noncommodified conceptions” of “corrective justice”).
328. Bibas, supra note 39, at 1386 (“[J ]ustice and punishment are classic
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noted in another context, “[p]ublic confidence and faith in the
justice system are essential to the law’s democratic legitimacy,
329
moral force, and popular obedience.” The criminal justice system should, therefore, “forestall cynicism by forbidding practic330
es that openly promote injustice or public doubts about guilt.”
DNA waivers, however, promote doubt and cynicism. They send
the message that the government is more interested in cost
savings and administrative convenience—or worse, covering up
wrongdoing—than in using the most powerful evidence of truth
331
available.
The damage, moreover, will be compounded by the natural
consequences of DNA waivers: guilty defendants with plausible
innocence claims will be able to proclaim their innocence without fear of contradiction. These claims can be extremely convincing. As the director of the organization that sought to exonerate Richard Coleman, whose guilt was posthumously
confirmed by DNA evidence, said of witnessing Coleman’s execution, at which Coleman continued to proclaim his innocence:
“How can somebody, with such equanimity, such dignity, such
quiet confidence, make those his final words even though he is
332
guilty?” Although prisoners have always loudly and falsely
asserted their innocence—even when their claims can be dis333
proven —the government’s refusal to perform testing will look
334
like a cover-up. In short, the fact that more than 260 people
have been exonerated by DNA despite the paucity of available
evidence and numerous procedural hurdles has hurt public conpublic goods.” (citing Schulhofer, supra note 13, at 1985)).
329. Id. at 1387; see also Gregory M. Dyer & Brendan Judge, Note, Criminal Defendants’ Waiver of the Right to Appeal—An Unacceptable Condition of
a Negotiated Sentence or Plea Bargain, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 664
(1990) (arguing that “[ b]y allowing prosecutors to secure from defendants a
waiver of their rights to appeal, courts are becoming accomplices to police violations and trial court errors”).
330. Bibas, supra note 39, at 1387.
331. See, e.g., Editorial, Truth and Plea Bargains, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010,
at WK7 ( praising the Justice Department’s decision to limit the use of DNA
waivers in plea agreements and stating that the decision sends “a valuable
message to all prosecutors that while the finality of convictions is important,
justice must take priority”).
332. Michael D. Shear and Maria Glod, DNA Tests Support 1992 Virginia
Execution, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2006, at B1 (quoting James C. McCloskey).
333. Jacobi & Caroll, supra note 38, at 270 (“Even among those cases vetted and supported by innocence projects, in an estimated fifty to sixty percent,
testing further implicate[s] the defendant.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
334. See supra note 3.
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fidence in the justice system; the use of DNA waivers will do
the same.
B. JUSTIFICATIONS
As seen, there are strong reasons to be skeptical of DNA
waivers. There are also, of course, potential benefits to their
use. This Section will consider these justifications before the
Article concludes with an evaluation of the merits of DNA
waivers. First, DNA waivers may preserve scarce testing resources by screening out the truly guilty. Second, and relatedly,
DNA waivers may slightly reduce the number of innocent people who plead guilty by increasing the cost of doings so. Finally,
waivers may produce more meaningful guilty pleas: defendants
who plead guilty without giving up the right to future DNA
testing may still cling, publicly and privately, to fantasies of
innocence.
1. Reducing Unmeritorious Claims
To the extent that it is true that, faced with a demand for a
DNA waiver, most innocent defendants will accept a harsher
punishment or insist on trial, DNA waivers may provide a
worthwhile mechanism to prevent the truly guilty from wasting
335
testing resources. As the First Circuit has noted in the appeal
waiver context, “With court-appointed counsel freely available
and nothing to lose by trying, a defendant, unfettered by a
waiver agreement, is quite likely to appeal on a wing and a
336
prayer.” Tonja Jacobi and Gwendolyn Carroll have argued
convincingly that the same is true of requests for DNA test337
ing. This is because “[t]he chance of a false negative result,
however small, creates the possibility that guilty parties will
338
benefit from seeking post-conviction DNA testing.” Thus, in
the absence of any disincentive, guilty prisoners will seek test335. On similar grounds, some authors have argued that DNA testing
should not be available to those who have pleaded guilty.
336. United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 22 (1st Cir. 2001).
337. Jacobi & Carroll, supra note 38, at 270 (“Even among those cases vetted and supported by innocence projects, in an estimated fifty to sixty percent,
testing ‘further implicate[s] the defendant.’ However, even these figures understate the problem. These figures do not mean that forty to fifty percent of
those granted post-conviction DNA testing are exonerated by the tests. Many
results are neither exculpatory nor guilt-confirming; they are inconclusive.”
(quoting Stephanie Simon, DNA Tests for Inmates Debated, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
10, 2003, at A10)).
338. Id. at 275.
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ing, despite the fact that it is extremely likely to inculpate
them further. This is a problem, because requests for DNA testing can be expensive in terms of the cost of tests themselves
and prosecutorial resources devoted to screening, thus poten339
In addition, false
tially crowding out meritorious claims.
claims can impose costs on victims and their families—costs
340
that pre-DNA rules of finality functioned to avoid. Some disincentive is needed, then, to prevent false claims of innocence
341
from “overwhelming the . . . system.” Allowing DNA waivers
could provide this disincentive in the form of the additional
penalty (or perhaps a trial) that a prosecutor would demand in
exchange for a defendant’s refusal to sign.
The danger, of course, is that as discussed above, some of
the few innocent defendants who plead guilty will—along with
the many truly guilty—choose to sign the waivers rather than
pay the price for not doing so. This is a significant cost in a system that is designed, after all, to protect the rare wrongfully
convicted defendant. As Professor Alschuler has observed in a
different context: “Forcing all defendants who submit Alford
pleas to confess at gunpoint or entering automatic guilty pleas
on their behalf would similarly improve the accuracy of the
‘typical’ defendant’s statement. Aggregate accuracy of this sort
342
belongs in Alice in Wonderland.” The same may be said of
pushing all defendants who plead guilty to sign DNA waivers.
2. Reducing False Guilty Pleas
Although the potential of DNA waivers to prevent the exoneration of wrongfully convicted defendants is straightforward, their availability may, less obviously, benefit innocent
defendants at the pretrial stage. For the innocent, giving up the
right to future DNA testing is, even if there is no evidence immediately available for testing, an extremely costly concession;
339. See id. at 268–69; see also Stone, supra note 185, at 62–67 (explaining
that DNA testing in one case may cost “from $2,500 to $5,000” and describing
the preservation and manpower costs associated with DNA testing).
340. See Jacobi & Carroll, supra note 337, at 268–69 (explaining the costs
to victims presented by DNA testing).
341. Id. at 270. Jacobi and Carroll’s proposed solution to this problem is to
punish false innocence claims with further incarceration. Id. at 276 (“This
Part [of the article] provides an economic model that illustrates that, by punishing prisoners with additional incarceration if DNA tests confirm their guilt,
states can structure incentives such that innocent prisoners will seek postconviction DNA testing and guilty prisoners will not.”).
342. Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The
Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1417 (2003).
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343

for the guilty, it is virtually costless. Reluctance to sign a
DNA waiver may therefore act as a signal of innocence, and
this additional information could help guide prosecutors in bor344
derline cases. On the other hand, the value of this signal will
likely be greatly diminished by truly guilty defendants attempting to mimic “innocent” behavior by refusing to agree to a waiver—and, perhaps, by those who are unwilling to take that final
step towards truly acknowledging their guilt.
There is a chance that that prosecutorial insistence on a
DNA waiver may cause some innocent defendants to elect to go
345
to trial. At minimum, in a very limited number of the cases
the DNA waiver may jolt an innocent defendant planning to
346
plead guilty into reconsidering that decision. The waiver reminds the defendant that he is not just giving up a right to trial, but the right to establish his innocence should the means be
available. As one waiver in the Southern District of Illinois
provides:
The Defendant states that knowing and understanding his right to
request DNA testing, he knowingly and voluntarily waivers and gives
up that right. . . . He further understands that he is waiving the right
to request DNA testing of evidence in this case in the current proceeding, in any proceeding following conviction under . . . [the Innocence
Protection Act] and in any other type of proceeding in which DNA
testing may be requested. He fully understands that, as a result of his
waiver . . . that he will never have another opportunity to have the evidence in this case submitted for DNA testing or to employ the results
of DNA testing to support a claim that he is actually innocent of the of347
fense(s) to which he pleads guilty pursuant to this Plea Agreement.

Nonetheless, it seems doubtful that the existence vel non of
a speculative future opportunity to establish their innocence is
343. See Jacobi & Carroll, supra note 38, at 270–76 (explaining that, due to
the small possibility of a false negative, truly guilty prisoners have an incentive
to seek DNA testing even though it will very likely inculpate them further).
344. Cf. Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the
Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114
HARV. L. REV. 430, 503 (2000) (“[T]he right to silence helps factfinders distinguish between factually innocent and guilty suspects and defendants. . . . [U]nder the right-to-silence regime . . . innocents still tell the truth,
whereas guilty suspects separate themselves by rationally exercising the
right.”).
345. Cf. Bibas, supra note 39, at 1382 (“If the law made it harder for innocent defendants to plead guilty, it would minimize both actual and perceived
injustices.”).
346. Cf. King & O’Neill, supra note 72, at 231 (discussing the empirical evidence that some defendants avoid plea agreements that include appeal waivers).
347. Plea Agreement § III.7.A., at 11, United States v. McPike, Criminal
No. 05-30069-WDS (S.D. Ill. May 6, 2005)) (emphasis added).
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a meaningful factor for many of the innocent defendants who
plead guilty.
3. Encouraging Stronger Admissions of Guilt
Finally, a guilty plea unaccompanied by a waiver of DNA
testing may weaken the strength of the guilt admission because
it leaves room for the defendant to revisit this admission in the
348
future. In this respect, the debate mirrors that over the use of
nolo contendere and Alford pleas. A guilty plea is supposed to
349
be a full admission that the defendant is guilty. Every factor
that makes the plea any less of a full admission of guilt may be
viewed as weakening that admission—both when the admission is made and in the future, when the defendant may change
his mind and decide to challenge his conviction through DNA
testing.
As Professor Stephanos Bibas has noted, “[T]he criminal
law seeks to lead offenders to repent by humbling them, to exact moral sanctions, and then to return them to the community
as equals. Offenders cannot accept responsibility and repent
350
until they admit their actions.” Offenders, however, sometimes resist the “painful truth by lying to themselves and oth351
ers.” The availability of postconviction DNA testing may allow guilty defendants to cling to the idea that they will one day
prove their innocence, thus delaying coming to terms with their
guilt or avoiding it altogether. Pushing offenders to give up the
352
right to testing, then, could help them reach “catharsis.”
Whether or not DNA waivers might prove therapeutic for
some guilty defendants, however, the treatment is clearly
harmful to the innocent. As Professor Albert Alschuler ob348. See Daina Borteck, Pleas for DNA Testing: Why Lawmakers Should
Amend State Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes to Apply to Prisoners Who
Pled Guilty, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1429, 1439 (2004) (“Giving a defendant who
pled guilty access to post-conviction DNA testing suggests that the defendant
lied about his guilt when entering his plea, thus undermining the basic assumption that guilty pleas are voluntary, intelligent and truthful.”).
349. See, e.g., United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989) (“A plea of
guilty and the ensuing conviction comprehend all of the factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a lawful
sentence.”).
350. Bibas, supra note 39, at 1393.
351. Id.; see also David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the
Criminal Courts, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 279, 285 (1993) (“The acceptance of
nolo and Alford pleas from sex offenders, however, may reinforce cognitive distortions and denial.”).
352. Bibas, supra note 39, at 1400.
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served in his response to Professor Bibas, “[i]f the time for shattering pride ever comes, it comes only after a determination of
353
guilt.” Similarly, if the law can be used to help the truly
guilty, surely it should not do so at the expense of the truly
innocent.
CONCLUSION
The right to DNA testing in the United States has become
well-established. Forty-eight states, the District of Columbia,
and the federal government allow some defendants limited ac354
cess to postconviction DNA testing. These rights are the exception to the normal rules of finality, granted because of
DNA’s exceptional accuracy. This accuracy, and the exonerations it has produced, have led to a reconsideration of cherished, but empirically untested, notions of the reliability of the
criminal justice system. They have also, albeit incompletely,
provoked a renewed commitment—reflected in new ethical
rules, compensation schemes, and the testing statutes themselves—to the protection of innocence. But there is a danger
that, as has happened with other advances in the protections
afforded to the accused, the scope of DNA testing rights, and
the spirit embodied in them, will erode as they lose their novelty. There is evidence that this has already begun. DNA waivers—through which a defendant gives up the right to the testing, and possibly preservation, of DNA evidence—were sought
by federal prosecutors in several populous districts between
2004 and early 2010. The history of similar innovations in plea
bargaining also suggests that the use of DNA waivers may
spread to the states. It is therefore important to evaluate the
validity of these waivers and to consider their implications for
defendants, prosecutors, the public, and the criminal justice
system as a whole.
The great weight of federal precedent suggests that DNA
waivers are valid. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the
validity of waiver is to be presumed for even the most fundamental of constitutional and statutory rights. Waivers must be
knowing and voluntary, but in the criminal context this standard tolerates ignorance of many critical facts—including, possibly, the existence of exculpatory evidence. Some lower courts
have fashioned a “miscarriage of justice” exception to the en353. Alschuler, supra note 342, at 1421.
354. See supra notes 21–23.
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forceability of similar waivers, but the extension of this doctrine to the DNA waiver is as speculative as it is desirable.
If, then, DNA waivers are likely to be generally enforceable, are they good policy? The risks are clear: for the same reasons some innocent people plead guilty—including the suppression of evidence—some innocent people will also sign DNA
waivers, perpetuating the injustice. If these were the only costs,
DNA waivers, if used judiciously, might be justifiable. This is
because their benefits are also clear: spurious postconviction
innocence claims waste valuable resources and cause needless
harm to victims and families, and claims by those who have
both pleaded guilty and waived their right to future testing
may be especially likely to be spurious. Moreover, the use of
waivers may discourage some innocent defendants from pleading guilty and push the truly guilty towards a fuller admission
of their culpability. Indeed, in cases in which a defendant’s
guilt has already been conclusively established by DNA evidence, there is very little likelihood of injustice resulting from a
denial of future testing; these may be the “exceptional” cases
the Justice Department’s new waiver policy contemplates.
The risk of preventing the exoneration of some innocent defendants is not the only cost of DNA waivers, however. The removal of the check provided by DNA testing will eliminate an
incentive for accuracy and ethical behavior among prosecutors.
The commodification of the right to proof of innocence will
erode the renewed commitment to preventing wrongful convictions that has, to an extent, emerged in recent years. And perhaps most importantly, the use of DNA waivers will devastate
public confidence in the justice system. What could be, on its
face, more contrary to the ideal of justice than to seek a guarantee that the most conclusive evidence of truth remain untested? Ultimately, although the ills DNA waivers seek to address
are real, the treatment is worse than the disease.

